UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF MIND

Khensur Rinpoche Geshe Tashi Tsering

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

Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics
Volume 2, The Mind

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The Nature of Mind

The first part of this volume presents an account of mind drawn from Indian Buddhist sources, and this immediately raises some difficulties for readers accustomed to notions of mind in Western philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. One key issue is that the term *mind* in Western contexts suggests a single entity that endures over time and has various capacities, dispositions, or features. In contrast, the Buddhist sources cited by our authors maintain that mind is *episodic*, such that a mind (Skt., *citta*) is a continuum (*santāna*) of mental moments, each moment causally emerging from the previous moment and acting as a cause for the subsequent moment. Each mind is thus a unique moment of consciousness (*jñāna*) or awareness (*saṃvitti*). The analysis of the nature of mind is thus actually an analysis of what, in many Western contexts, would be a moment of mind or a "mind event." In a way that can be additionally confusing, Buddhist authors will often speak of plural "minds" that pertain to the same person at different points of time or in different contexts, such as the mind in a moment of visual consciousness or the mind in a moment of one-pointed concentration. Both of these minds could be in the same continuum, such that in referring to someone named Jane, one could speak of "Jane's many minds," a locution that seems odd in Western contexts. In our translation, we have tried to avoid using the plural *minds* as much as possible, but it is important to note that, even in the singular, the term *mind* refers to a single mind event — that is, a discrete moment in a mental continuum.

Turning now to the nature of mind, our authors focus on the most widely cited account — namely, that mind is clear (Tib., *gsal ba*) and aware (*rig pa*). Here, the term *clear* renders two distinct Sanskrit terms that evoke the phenomenal character of mind and also one of its essential properties. In relation to the Sanskrit term *prakāśa*, the Tibetan translation is most accurately rendered as "luminous," in the sense that the mind "illuminates" or presents contents, much as a lamp illuminates whatever is nearby. Unlike a physical lamp, however, the mind does not depend on proximity to "illuminate" whatever is present in a moment of

consciousness; a concept of the Eiffel Tower, for example, can be presented in consciousness without any need for one to be in Paris. A second key feature is that, even in exceptional cases where a moment of consciousness has no cognitive content, a mind or moment of consciousness still includes the phenomenal character of presenting or illuminating, even though there is no content to be illuminated.

The mind is also clear in that it is transparent (Skt., *prabhāsvara*). Here, the term *clear* points to a fundamental property of mind. Water, for example, is by nature clear, in that even when it is murky, the impurities that obscure it can be removed, and its natural clarity or transparency will return. Likewise, the mind is clear in that no particular object (such as the Eiffel Tower) or affective state (such as anger) is essential to a moment of consciousness. This point is especially crucial for Buddhist approaches to personal transformation and behavior change, since it means that the dysfunctional habits that produce suffering and dissatisfaction can be transformed, precisely because they are not essential to the mind itself. This means in particular that ignorance — the fundamental cognitive distortion that underlies suffering — is not an essential property of the mind, and it is therefore possible to remove that distortion without putting an end to consciousness itself.

While the mind is clear — or perhaps "luminously clear," to capture the two senses encompassed by that term — it is also aware (Tib., *rig pa*; Skt., *saṃvit*). In general, this means that a mind or moment of consciousness has an epistemic character; that is, the mind does not simply illuminate, it also does so in an informative way. More specifically, at the level of analysis deployed by our authors, a mind or moment of consciousness is *about* its object, and it presents that object in a way that is relevant to action that engages that object. Our authors point out that mind, by virtue of being aware, is distinct from matter, which lacks this character. Yet two points here are crucial. First, while the mind is distinct from matter, it nevertheless depends on a material "basis" for it to function. In other words, the mind is necessarily embodied, and the constraints posed by a particular embodiment — such as the capacities of one's sensory organs — must be taken into account when examining cognitive processes and other aspects of the mind. Second, while the mind

is intrinsically aware by virtue of presenting objects as relevant to embodied action, it is not necessarily the case that a moment of awareness — that is, any given mind event — provides reliable information about its object. It is for this reason, in part, that Buddhist theorists are so concerned to distinguish the many varieties of awareness.

Varieties of Cognition: The Case of Sensory and Mental Consciousness

Much of part 1 is devoted to examining different ways of categorizing mind, and of particular note here is the distinction between sense consciousness and mental consciousness. In this context, the use of the term *minds* in the plural does not apply just to the continuum of mind events. We can also properly say that a sentient being in any given moment may have multiple minds. This points to an important feature of the Buddhist account presented by our authors — namely, that it adopts what could be called a modularity thesis, similar to some contemporary accounts in cognitive science. Modularity itself is a complex topic, and contemporary notions encompass a variety of competing approaches. In simple terms, *modularity* means that distinct cognitive processes are executed by distinct mental modules that are "encapsulated," in that they can function independently of other modules. Strong forms of modularity often connect these functions to specific brain regions, and they may posit modularity even at complex levels of processing. Weaker forms of modularity assert that modules operate at more basic levels of processing, and such theories may not maintain a strong correspondence between a module and any localized brain region. From the perspective of this highly simplified account of modularity, the Indian Buddhist theorists assert a weak form of modularity, especially in regard to the five forms of sense consciousness.

In brief, an instance of sense consciousness emerges initially when the physical sense faculty contacts the object and thereby becomes its *dominant condition* (Skt., *adhipatipratyaya*). With additional conditions in place, the mental processes required to produce, for example, the first moment of a visual consciousness can occur simultaneously with the processes that produce the first moment of any other sense consciousness, such as an auditory or olfactory one. In this way, multiple sense "minds" can (and usually do) arise simultaneously, and this suggests that sense consciousness exhibits at least a weak form of modularity. For at the low

level of processing required to produce the first moment of a sense consciousness, the five kinds of sense consciousness operate independently of each other.

Our authors point out that the low level of processing that produces an initial moment of sense consciousness is not sufficient to induce an action that engages with a sensory object. To facilitate action toward a sensory object, it must be conceptualized or categorized, and this can only occur when the data from sense consciousness moves into mental consciousness. At that point, on the basis of additional conditions such as desires and goals, a concept that facilitates goal-oriented action can occur. Now, however, the modularity related to sense consciousness no longer applies, because only one mental consciousness can occur at any given time. When conceiving sense objects, mental consciousness depends on the lower-level processing provided by sense consciousness as well as other mental processes such as memory.

One important aspect of this articulation of six types of consciousness — mental consciousness and the five forms of sense consciousness — is that it reflects the commitment to developing models of cognition that do not require an autonomous self (Skt., *ātman*) or perceiver (*bhoktṛ*) as the agent of a cognitive act. Drawing on the work of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, our authors point out that the sense of subjectivity in any moment of consciousness is simply a momentary "phenomenal form" or "image" (*ākāra*) that emerges simultaneously with the image or representation of the object. This "image" of subjectivity thus has no causal role or agency in that moment of visual perception; it instead reflects a basic structural feature — the subject-object relation — that characterizes any moment of consciousness bearing on an object.

Epistemic Reliability and the Suspicion of Concepts

The emphasis on building cognitive models that set aside any notion of an autonomous, unchanging "self" acting as the agent of cognition returns us to the basic problem of suffering and dissatisfaction. As noted above, Buddhist theorists in India maintain that the fundamental problem of suffering is caused by ignorance, a fundamental cognitive distortion whose most basic manifestation is precisely this sense of an autonomous, unchanging "self" as the agent of actions, the perceiver of perceptions, the controller of the mind-body system, and so on. For these theorists, this distortion can only be solved by cultivating a form of wisdom that counteracts it. A basic theory here is that two cognitive states can stand in opposition to one another such that one necessarily inhibits the other from arising. An additional claim is that, when a nondeceptive (Skt., *avisaṃvādi*) cognition — one that is epistemically reliable — comes into conflict with an unreliable one, the reliable cognitive state, if sufficiently robust, will always inhibit the unreliable one. Moreover, the dispositions that cause the unreliable or distorted cognition to arise can eventually be eliminated by using contemplative techniques to immerse oneself in the experience of the reliable cognition. This basic model, discussed at length in part 6, applies to all cases where one seeks to eliminate cognitive distortions, and it applies especially to the cultivation of wisdom as a means to uproot ignorance.

Given the central role played by epistemic reliability or nondeceptivity in practices designed to transform a practitioner, it is no surprise that this issue surfaces repeatedly in Buddhist analyses of cognitive processes. The Indian Buddhist tradition contains an enormous amount of material simply on the question of epistemic reliability, especially in the context of a *valid cognition* (*pramāṇa*), which is both reliable and also a motivator of action. The foundational question of epistemic reliability leads to many other nuanced and subtle inquiries that produce the taxonomies in this section of part 1. One intriguing distinction that emerges in these taxonomic analyses is the notion that epistemic reliability can still apply to cognitions that are "mistaken" (*bhrānta*). Well-formed inferences, for example, are always

epistemically reliable, but since they are necessarily conceptual, they are also mistaken. Here, epistemic reliability is rooted in the way that a cognition facilitates effective action in relation to an object, and in part this means that a cognition need only be accurate in regard to the causal capacities of the object relevant to one's goal-oriented action. Thus, if I infer from billowing smoke that a fire is occurring in a particular location, my conceptual cognition of fire can enable me to take effective action — whether I seek warmth or want to douse the fire. Yet that conceptualization of "fire" itself is also mistaken, precisely because it is conceptual.

The notion that conceptual cognitions are necessarily mistaken — even when they are epistemically reliable — reflects an overall suspicion of conceptuality that characterizes Indian Buddhism from its earliest days, but the technical account in part 1 draws especially on Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist epistemologists. For these theorists, conceptual cognitions are always mistaken in two ways. First, the object that appears phenomenally in my awareness, known as the conceptual "image" (*pratibimba*) of the object, is taken to be identical to the functional thing that I seek to act upon as the *engaged object* (*pravṛttiviṣaya*) of my action. In other words, the phenomenally presented object "fire" in my conceptual cognition does not have the causal properties of an actual fire — the thought of a fire cannot burn wood. Yet our cognitive system creates a fusion (*ekīkaraṇa*) of this phenomenal appearance with the engaged object to which the conceptual image of "fire" refers.

Conceptual cognitions are also mistaken in another way: they take the categories presented in conceptualizations as truly real. Buddhist epistemologists say those categories are actually constructed through the process of concept formation. For example, the conceptualization of fire, when taken as referring to a real, causally efficient thing, presents that thing as bearing the same fundamental properties — some essence that constitutes a thing as "fire" — as all other things that can be categorized as "fire." This projection of our categories into the world, however, is false for these theorists, since they maintain that all instances of things that we call "fire" are entirely unique. Instead, we construct concepts and categories through a process of exclusion (*apoha*), whereby the cognitive

system forms categories primarily by excluding what is incapable of or irrelevant to the desired causal outcomes.

This brief excursus into the questions of reliability, error, and conceptualization demonstrates the finely grained and insightful analyses typical of the material found throughout this volume. Much more could be said about the taxonomies presented in part 1, but as is perhaps already evident from the approach to conceptualization discussed above, many of these materials point to a key issue: the primacy of direct perception, or what might be called a kind of "empirical stance."

Empiricism and Buddhist "Science"

In his first essay in volume 1 of this series, Thupten Jinpa speaks eloquently about the notion of "Buddhist science" and the ways we might understand that term. Readers are encouraged to consult that essay for an appreciation of the methodological and theoretical commitments that Buddhist authors hold, and the way we might answer the question "Is this science?" Here, deferring to Jinpa's lengthier discussion, I will just examine two issues that point to the type of "yes and no" answer that he gives.

One way to understand what we mean by *science* concerns the scientific method and the various commitments that it entails. In terms of the process of implementing research, an idealized and simplified account of *science* would involve: (1) formulating a theory, (2) generating hypotheses based on the theory, (3) testing hypotheses through experimentation, and (4) revising or confirming the theory based on the results of experiments. This abbreviated and idealized account excludes many issues, such as the way institutional and cultural pressures might prevent theory revision even in the face of contrary experimental evidence. Yet even setting aside these issues, this idealized process does point to one challenge for the notion of Buddhist science: theory revision.

This volume focuses especially on Indian Buddhist sources written in Sanskrit, and these texts emerged over more than a millennium of inquiry. We might wonder how exactly these theories and models were formulated. For example, what role did actual phenomenological inquiry play, especially if investigated with contemplative techniques? Were there attempts to test hypotheses with experimentation? Were textual accounts concerned primarily with claims made in other texts, or did they employ empirical observations to rebut textual critiques? The short answer to these and related questions is that we do not know. Certainly, just as with modern science, the need to defend one's published views would drive many responses and adjustments to theories, but we do not know how much observation and even experimentation went into the Indian Sanskrit texts. However, one point is clear: substantial theory revision about key

issues such as the nature of concept formation has not occurred for many centuries. And if we take science to require an ongoing process of theory revision, then we would likely conclude that "Buddhist science" is a highly contentious term.

Science, however, may also be characterized as embodying a particular commitment to a rigorous and ongoing inquiry into the nature of the world and the beings within it, where our notion of "rigor" requires us to base our knowledge claims in experience itself. This "empirical stance," to borrow a term from Bas van Fraassen, requires us to set aside our theory commitments, our texts and publications, and our assumptions about the possible in favor of a kind of careful and disciplined observation that is rooted in the evidence of the senses. This attitude is precisely what underlies the Buddhist suspicion of conceptuality and theorization as an end in itself. And while it too can be — and indeed, has been — idealized in the context of Buddhist inquiries into the mind and its processes, the principled commitment to this empirical stance, which requires setting aside the authority even of the Buddha's own words, might be enough to say that, yes, we can properly speak of Buddhist science. As you read through this volume, that empiricist spirit may not be evident on every page, but if you keep it in mind, perhaps you will agree that Buddhist science is an appropriate rubric for the detailed materials curated by our skilled authors.

John Dunne

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Conceptual and Nonconceptual

GENERALLY SPEAKING, the Tibetan term usually rendered as "conceptuality" (*rtog pa*)[60] has multiple senses in translations of the early Buddhist texts. For example, the *Treasury of Knowledge* says:

> Inquiry and analysis are coarse and subtle. [61]

When engaging the object, *inquiry* (*rtog pa*, *vitarka*) is a mental factor that engages it in a coarse way and *analysis* (*dpyod pa*, *vicāra*) is a mental factor that engages it in a subtle way. In *Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes*, however, it says:

> The conceptual constructions (*kun rtog*, *parikalpa*) that pertain to the unreal
> consist of minds and mental factors of the three realms. [62]

Minds and mental factors that are mistaken in having a dualistic appearance and are included within the levels of any of the three realms are said to be *conceptual constructions.* Dignāga's *Compendium of Valid Cognition* says: [37]

> Direct perception is free from conceptualization
> that attaches a name, a type, and so on. [63]

Here Dignāga defines *conceptualization* (*rtog pa*, *kalpanā*) in terms of those cognitions that apprehend their objects by way of applying a

linguistic "name" or a "type" — that is, a class — to the object. In other words, the object is qualified by some form of universal. Of these different senses, we will use *conceptuality* here in accordance with how it is defined in the Buddhist epistemological treatises of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers. This usage of the term also occurs in the sūtras. For example, *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says: "Mahāmati, conceptual thought is what finds expression in words such as 'This is an elephant, a horse, a chariot, a pedestrian, a living being, a woman,' and so on. Thus a conceptualization is that which illuminates the warrant for applying a term to an object, as when one thinks 'It is this kind and not another.'" [64]

As explained above, sense consciousness is nonconceptual, whereas mental consciousness may be either conceptual or nonconceptual. Certain types of consciousness directly cognize whatever object they engage, and based on this they are said to be nonconceptual, such as an eye consciousness seeing a vase. Also, there are many types of consciousness that cannot perceive the object directly but apprehend it by way of taking as their observed object something that partially resembles the actual object. Such types of cognition are referred to as conceptual. An example is a cognition that remembers yesterday's meal. Although yesterday's meal does not appear directly to a memory occurring now, there is an appearance in that memory that resembles yesterday's meal. [38] And it is via this appearance that yesterday's meal is taken as the object of that cognition and is remembered. Furthermore, although an eye consciousness seeing a vase is nonconceptual, when the eyes are closed after having seen the vase, the appearance of the vase persists in the mental consciousness, and such a mental consciousness is conceptual. Regarding this, Dharmakīrti's *Exposition of Valid Cognition* says:

> A cognition connected to concepts
> does not have a clear appearance of the object. [65]

And:

> Any cognition that has a clear appearance [of the object]
> is nonconceptual. [66]

When an object appears to a consciousness mixed with an object universal,[67] then it is a conceptual consciousness. If a cognition directly perceives its object unmixed with a universal, then it is a nonconceptual consciousness.

In *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition*, Dharmakīrti gives a very clear account of the difference between conceptual and nonconceptual consciousness:

> Conceptual cognition is a mental consciousness. It arises, without depending on the proximity of a causally efficient object, through the latent potencies for that conceptualization. It apprehends an object that is not restricted to a sense faculty, and it does so through some relation to a sensory experience, either together or separately.[68]

Conceptual minds do not rely on the proximity of an observed object's causal capacity [39] but arise owing to the power of past habituations or latent potencies of language-based thought processes. *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says:

> An attribute, an attribute-possessor, the relation,
> and customary conventions — having apprehended these separately,
> an object is cognized in that way
> by associating them, and not otherwise.

> If one understands the attribute, the attribute-possessor, their relationship, and the customary conventions posited, then by associating them, one apprehends the attribute-possessor as qualified by some attribute. Such is the case in the expression "staff holder." That cognition does not happen otherwise, because one does not have that cognition if one does not cognize the things [i.e., attribute and

attribute-possessor], their relationship, and the conventions expressing them. [69]

Here the following kinds of cognition are recognized as conceptual: those that involve predication, such as a thing and its property; the relation between horns and the horned animal; and relations involving customary conventions, such as the notion of a chief and his deputies. In brief, all cognitions that combine objects through mutual association involving an attribute and an attribute-possessor are said to be conceptual mental cognitions.

The same text says:

> It is not possible for [a direct perception such as eye consciousness to apprehend something] as the possessor of a universal, or a quality, or an activity. This is so because the distinct things [e.g., the universal and its possessor] and their relationship do not appear [in direct perception], so it cannot associate them; and this is so also because they are not perceived that way [i.e., as distinct but related], just like water and milk [are not perceived as distinct when mixed together]. And even in the case of cognizing a distinct thing [in a way that categorizes it], that cognition:
>
> > . . . depends upon recollecting a linguistic convention, and by nature it associates
> >
> > [the present object] with what has been previously experienced. [40]
> >
> > How could that cognition occur in eye consciousness,
> >
> > which lacks any apprehension of past and future?
>
> Within this [eye consciousness] there is no ability to make associations because, given that it arises through the proximity of an object, there is no analysis involved. If it were to analyze, then there would be no difference between sense consciousness and mental consciousness. If there

> were no difference between them, various consequences would absurdly follow, such as it would both apprehend and not apprehend past and future; it would both categorize and not categorize its object; it would both infer and not infer its object; and it would both depend on and not depend on the presence of the object. [70]

A nonconceptual sense consciousness arises from its three conditions having been met, whether one wants it to arise or not. For example, when the three conditions of an eye consciousness seeing a cow have been met and that eye consciousness arises, even if one were to deliberately try to think it is a horse, one will still see the cow. Conversely, with respect to a thought conceiving something as a cow, if one were to deliberately think it to be otherwise, it is possible to change that thought of a cow. Such a difference between conceptual and nonconceptual cognition is stated in *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition*:

> Moreover, if the thought of an attribute and so on were to arise, then even if [the three conditions for sensory perception] have been fully met, that thought can deliberately be changed, [41] as is the case with any conceptual consciousness. The content of conceptual consciousness can be changed through deliberate thought, but this is not so for sense consciousness. Once the three conditions have been met, even if one sets aside the thought of the object as a cow and instead thinks of it as a horse, one still sees a cow. [71]

In general there is the way in which conceptual thought is defined in the manner of the earlier quotation from the *Compendium of Valid Cognition*: "Direct perception is free from conceptualization that attaches a name, a type, and so on."[72] Also, Dharmakīrti's *Exposition of Valid Cognition* says:

> Any consciousness that apprehends a linguistic referent is a conceptual cognition of that object. [73]

A consciousness is said to be a conceptual cognition regarding an object if the consciousness that apprehends the object takes that object's universal or linguistic referent as its observed object. Also, *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says: "What is conceptual cognition? Conceptual cognition is an expressive cognition. A conceptual cognition is one that has an appearance that is suitable to be associated with words." [74] Conceptual cognition is a cognition whose phenomenal content appears or is apprehended to be associable with language. *Drop of Reasoning* makes the same point.

So the definition of a conceptual cognition is: a construing awareness (*zhen rig*) that apprehends *word* and *referent* as suitable to be associated. The significance of the phrase "suitable to be associated" in this definition is explained as follows. Some conceptual cognitions, such as one in the mind of a preverbal infant, take as their objects either the object universal or the word universal, but they do not take a combination of both as their object. [42] Therefore such cognitions do not apprehend word and referent as associated. Nevertheless, those cognitions apprehend them as suitable to be associated. Alternatively, some texts say that what is meant by "word referent" (*sgra don*) is the mere universal that is apprehended by the mind, and its meaning should not be understood as the separate terms *word universal* and *object universal*. [75]

There is a twofold categorization of conceptual cognitions: those that concur with their objects and those that do not. A conceptual cognition whose engaged object exists is called a "conceptual cognition that concurs with its object." An example is the conceptual cognition apprehending a pot. A conceptual cognition whose engaged object does not exist is called a "conceptual cognition that does not concur with its object." An example is the conceptual cognition apprehending a rabbit's horns. Here, a pot is asserted to be the engaged object of a conceptual cognition apprehending a pot, and the horns of a rabbit is the engaged object of a conceptual cognition apprehending a rabbit's horns.

Also, when conceptual cognitions are categorized according to their purpose, there are two divisions: a conceptual cognition associating a word and a conceptual cognition associating a referent. A conceptual cognition associating a word is one that associates the *word* from the time of learning the linguistic convention with the *referent* at the time of applying

the convention as a classificatory one. An example is "This dappled thing is a cow." The difference between a linguistic convention and a classificatory convention is as follows. When a word is first applied to an object, that is a *linguistic convention*, and when that convention is used on later occasions, it is called a *classificatory convention*.

A conceptual cognition that connects a subject of predication with a predicated quality is called a "conceptual cognition associating a referent." An example is the conceptual cognition "This person is a staff holder." It cognizes by applying the predicated quality, "staff holder," to the subject of predication, "this person." Dignāga's *Compendium of Valid Cognition Autocommentary* says: [43]

> Suppose someone asks, "What is this so-called conceptual cognition?" It is that which associates a name, a class, and so on [with an object]. In the case of arbitrary words, an object is expressed as qualified by a name, such as "Ḍittha." In the case of class words, the object is expressed as qualified by a class, such as "cow." In the case of quality words, the object is expressed as qualified by a quality, such as "white." In the case of action words, the object is expressed as qualified by an activity, such as "cooking." And in the case of substance words, the object is expressed as qualified by a substance, such as "staff holder" or "horned."[76]

Here "name" indicates a conceptual cognition associating a word, and "class" indicates a conceptual cognition associating a *referent*. A conceptual cognition thinking "This person is Ḍittha" is a conceptual cognition associating a *word*. A conceptual cognition thinking "This conglomerate of characteristics such as a hump and so on is a cow" is a conceptual cognition associating a referent by way of a *class*. A conceptual cognition thinking "The color of a puṇḍarīka flower is white" is a conceptual cognition associating a referent by way of an *attribute*. A conceptual cognition thinking "Rice is cooking" is a conceptual cognition associating a referent by way of an *activity*. A conceptual cognition

thinking “This person is a staff holder” or “This yak is horned” is a conceptual cognition associating a referent by way of a *substance*. [44]

Also in some texts three types of conceptual cognitions are explained: conceptual cognitions that rely on a linguistic convention, conceptual cognitions that superimpose something else onto their objects, and conceptual cognitions of that which is hidden. A conceptual cognition that arises in dependence on associating a name or linguistic convention is a conceptual cognition that relies on a linguistic convention. An example is the conceptual cognition that arises in dependence on the statement “This bulbous thing is a pot” (which expresses the proper use of the word or verbal convention for *pot*). Superimposing something else onto an object, or apprehending it to be other than what it actually is, is a conceptual cognition that superimposes something else. An example is the conceptual cognition that, with inappropriate attention, superimposes attractiveness onto an unattractive object.[77] A conceptual cognition focused on something that is hidden to one is a conceptual cognition of that which is hidden. An example is a conceptual cognition apprehending a pot to be impermanent. This interpretation of types of conceptuality is presented in Dharmakīrti’s *Exposition of Valid Cognition*:

> [Two types of] conceptual cognition — one based on a convention (*saṃketa*)
> and one that superimposes another object —
> sometimes cause the error [of seeming to be perceptual]
> because they immediately follow a perception.
>
> A cognition such as a recollection,
> being the conceptual cognition of a remote object,
> is dependent upon convention (*samaya*),
> and it does not apprehend a perceptual object. [78]

The nature of a nonconceptual cognition is to be a moment of awareness that is free from any construing awareness that apprehends word and referent as suitable to be associated. There are two types: nonconceptual consciousness that concurs with the object and

nonconceptual consciousness that does not concur with the object. A nonconceptual consciousness whose engaged object exists is called a nonconceptual consciousness that [45] concurs with the object; examples include an eye consciousness apprehending a pot and an eye consciousness apprehending a pillar. A nonconceptual consciousness whose engaged object does not exist is called a nonconceptual consciousness that does not concur with the object; examples include a sense consciousness to which a snow mountain appears blue and a sense consciousness to which one moon appears as two.

In brief, a conceptual mental cognition and a nonconceptual sense cognition are different in various ways, including whether the cognition's object appears clearly; the cognition apprehends word and referent as suitable to be associated; the cognition depends on a linguistic convention; when this or that object appears in cognition, it appears to be fused with an object universal; a subject and its properties appear separately; the cognition apprehends a subject and its properties as mutually associated; the cognition qualifies its object with a class, a quality, or an action; the cognition is caused by remembering a linguistic convention; the cognition is qualified by time; the cognition apprehends earlier and later times in combination; or the cognition occurs due to the proximity of its observed object. [46]

4
Valid and Mistaken

Valid versus Nonvalid Forms of Cognition

The purpose of the presentations on valid cognition found in the scriptures is to help beings accomplish their desired goals. The various sufferings that exist in the world, which are universally unwelcome, occur on the basis of ignorance of the nature of things in reality. If one can find the valid means of knowing, then in reliance on them one can engage in correct norms of what is to be affirmed and what is to be rejected. In this way, one will be able to accomplish the desired goals. Dharmakīrti's *Drop of Reasoning* says: "Since correct cognition is the prerequisite to the fulfillment of everyone's aims, I will explain it." [79]

The Sanskrit word for "valid cognition" is *pramāṇa*, which is composed of two parts, *pra* and *māṇa*. Although the prefix *pra* can have many meanings, in this case it means "first." The second part, *māṇa*, means "to measure, comprehend, realize, or know." Therefore valid cognition is that which first, or newly, comprehends something that was not realized before. For example, *Exposition of Valid Cognition* says:

> It also reveals an object not known before. [80]

Alternatively, the syllable *pra* can mean "excellent" or "supreme," which in Sanskrit is *paramārtha*. Here too, the syllable *māṇa* means "to measure." So valid cognition is that which is nondeceptive and thus supremely knows its object. *Exposition of Valid Cognition* explains:

Valid cognition is nondeceptive cognition. [81] [47]

Thus the definition of valid cognition is: a newly acquired and nondeceptive cognition. The part of this definition that says "newly" excludes subsequent cognition from being valid cognition. The part that says "nondeceptive" excludes correct assumption, doubt, and distorted cognition from being valid cognition. The part that says "cognition" excludes the physical eye sense faculty and so on from being valid cognition. *Exposition of Valid Cognition* says:

> Valid cognition is nondeceptive cognition.
> [Regarding its object's] ability to perform a function,
> it is nondeceptive. [82]

And:

> It also reveals an object not known before. [83]

That is to say, consciousness that accords with the object's real way of existing is nondeceptive. Also, since it cognizes an object for the first time, or determines it on its own accord, it is characterized as "newly realizing."

Alternatively, valid cognition can be defined as: a consciousness that is nondeceptive regarding its comprehended object, which it has determined on its own accord. For example, *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* says:

> Right cognition has two aspects: direct perception and inferential understanding. These two are right because, when we act having determined an object through one or both of these two, we are not deceived with regard to that object's functioning. [84]

On this point — the definition of valid cognition — the views of the Buddhist schools from the Sautrāntika up to the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka are in harmony. [48]

In Candrakīrti's *Clear Words*, however, Dignāga's definition of valid cognition and views on direct perception and so on are refuted on the grounds that they are set forth on the basis of presupposing inherently existent phenomena. In Candrakīrti's own system, valid cognition is posited only on the basis of being nondeceptive in agreement with what is commonly accepted in everyday conventions of the world. Therefore being "nondeceptive" alone exhausts the meaning of what a valid cognition is, and there is no need to add the qualification "newly realizing" to the definition. So we need to understand from statements such as these that there are unique epistemological views in Candrakīrti's system.

In general, although the word *valid* can be applied to valid cognition, valid person, and valid scripture, the last two are not valid in their own right; so to be *valid* is synonymous with being a *valid cognition*. As for the two types of valid cognition — direct perception and inferential understanding — this will be explained in the context of the seven types of mind in chapter 18.

Buddhist epistemological texts differentiate the two kinds of effects of valid cognition: *mediated* effects of valid cognition and *unmediated* effects of valid cognition. This is to emphasize the point that every genuine goal desired by living beings is accomplished as either a direct or an indirect effect of valid cognition.

The definition of a nonvalid cognition is: that which is not a newly acquired and nondeceptive cognition with respect to its object. Instances of nonvalid cognition include a subsequent cognition [85] realizing sound to be impermanent and a thought holding sound to be permanent. Although a subsequent cognition realizing sound to be impermanent is nondeceptive regarding sound being impermanent, thus satisfying the meaning of *nondeceptive*, it does not newly realize sound [49] to be impermanent and thus does not satisfy the meaning of *newly realizing*. A thought holding sound to be permanent, being a mind that distortedly superimposes an incorrect attribute on sound, does not satisfy either the meaning of *nondeceptive* or of *newly realizing*. Among the seven types of cognition to be discussed later, distorted cognition, doubt, correct assumption, subsequent cognition, and indeterminate perception are all nonvalid cognitions.

As for Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka thinkers like Candrakīrti, since they maintain that valid cognition does not need to be newly realizing, and they define valid cognition as consciousness that is merely nondeceptive in accordance with what is commonly accepted in the world, subsequent cognition too qualifies as valid cognition because it is nondeceptive with regard to its principal object. Also, both conceptual and nonconceptual subsequent cognition are accepted to be valid direct perception because the former understands its object not in dependence on reasoning but through experience. For example, without relying on reasoning, you can know, in a mundane sense, a person whom you met before, so you can claim, "I know that person through direct perception." Therefore both conceptual and nonconceptual forms of direct perception are accepted in this system. Candrakīrti's refutation of Dignāga's epistemology in general — as well as his refutation of Dignāga's views on perception in particular — and Candrakīrti's own unique epistemological views will be addressed in detail in volume 4. [50]

Mistaken versus Unmistaken Cognition

There are two ways in which a cognition may be mistaken: it may be mistaken only with regard to its appearing object or it may be mistaken with regard to its engaged object as well as its appearing object. For example, a conceptual cognition apprehending a pot is mistaken only with regard to its appearing object, and a conceptual cognition apprehending a pot to be permanent is mistaken with regard to its engaged object as well as its appearing object. In the case of a conceptual cognition apprehending a pot, its appearing object appears to be a pot, but it is not a pot, [86] so this mind is mistaken with regard to its appearing object. In a conceptual cognition apprehending a pot to be permanent, not only does a pot *appear* as permanent, but the pot is *apprehended* to be permanent too, just as it appears. Therefore this mind is mistaken with regard to both its appearing object and its engaged object; thus it is known as a distorted cognition.

The definition of a mistaken cognition is: a mind that is mistaken with regard to its appearing object. Moreover, a mistaken cognition, while it must be mistaken with regard to its appearing object, may be either mistaken or unmistaken with regard to its object as cognized. [87] There are two types of cognition that are mistaken: mistaken conceptual cognition and mistaken nonconceptual cognition. Examples of these are, in the first case, a conceptual cognition apprehending a pot and, in the second case, a sense consciousness to which a white snow mountain appears blue. (The latter is categorized as a distorted cognition.) Conceptual cognitions are mistaken regarding their appearing object in that an object universal appears to be the object. Distorted cognitions are mistaken regarding their engaged object in that they hold their engaged object to exist in a way it does not. [51]

A mistaken cognition may be mistaken regarding its object due to the influence of either a temporary cause of error or a deeper cause of error. There are four types of temporary causes of error: (1) one that exists in the basis, (2) one that exists in the object, (3) one that exists in the location, (4) one that exists in the immediately preceding condition. First, an example of a nonconceptual cognition with a temporary cause of error in

the basis is the visual cognition of two moons that occurs when the eye is affected by an eye disorder. The main condition causing this mind to be mistaken comes about through the functioning of the *basis* — that is, the visual sense organ — so the cause of error is said to exist in the basis. Second, an example of a nonconceptual cognition with a temporary cause of error in the object is a sensory cognition in which a disc appears when a fan spins around very quickly. Third, an example of a nonconceptual cognition with a temporary cause of error in the location is the sensory cognition in which trees appear to be moving, as can occur when someone travels in a boat. Fourth, an example of a nonconceptual cognition with a temporary cause of error in the immediately preceding condition is a sensory cognition in which the ground appears to be red due to the mind being disturbed by anger. *Drop of Reasoning* says: "A direct perception is a cognition in which no error has been induced by an eye disorder, fast spinning, boat travel, mental disturbance, and so on." [88]

There are two types of conditions that cause such errors: conditions that distort the physical sense faculties and conditions that distort the mental sense faculty. The first has two types: external conditions that distort the physical sense faculties and internal conditions that distort them. The first type includes things like mirrors, voices inside a cave, summer sunlight on a pale sandy area nearby, and so on. [52] These, respectively, cause the apprehension of a reflection as a face, echoes as speech, a mirage as water, and so on. Second, internal conditions that distort the physical sense faculties include such things as an eye disorder, jaundice, infectious disease, and so on; these cause sensory cognitions to be mistaken.

There may also be errors regarding shape, color, number, measurement, and so on. For example, a circle of light appearing when a firebrand is spun around very fast is an error regarding *shape*; a white conch shell appearing yellow is an error regarding *color*; trees appearing to be moving as an effect of traveling in a boat is an error regarding *activity*; one moon appearing as two is an error regarding *number*; falling hairs appearing when there are none is an error regarding *nature*; sunshine at midnight appearing in a dream is an error regarding *time*; a large object appearing small when seen from a distance is an error regarding

measurement. Among those, a dream consciousness is a mental consciousness and the rest are sensory cognitions.

Also, Asaṅga's *Levels of Yogic Deeds* speaks of other causes of error: "One errs in five ways. What are those five ways? (1) Erring with regard to discernment, (2) erring with regard to number, (3) erring with regard to shape, (4) erring with regard to color, and (5) erring with regard to action."[89] In this context, erroneous discernment [53] is, for example, when one sees Devadatta and thinks it is Yajñadatta. "Erring with regard to action" is a synonym for "erring with regard to function."

As for deeper causes of error, these are as stated in *Ornament for the Middle Way*:

> From the ripening of latent potencies
> within a beginningless mental continuum,
> projected images appear, but since they are mistaken,
> they are in nature like illusions. [90]

According to sources such as the above, these are stable causes of error that have arisen since time without beginning. Since one is deeply habituated to viewing oneself and others as existing in an independent and autonomous way, then when anger, for example, arises toward people such as enemies whom one dislikes, the people who are the objects of that mental state appear to be independently and objectively unattractive. Similarly, *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra* says:

> Just so, Mahāmati, spiritually immature beings have minds affected by misconceptions that proliferate owing to various factors from time without beginning; they have mental states completely consumed by the fires of attachment, anger, and delusion. [91]

As for the second type, conditions that distort the mental sense faculty include dreams, intoxication, and medication, because these cause the mental consciousness to be mistaken. [54]

In the Buddhist epistemological texts, mistaken cognition is referred to also by the term *fallacious perception*. What might be the difference between these two terms? Mistaken cognition and fallacious perception are in fact synonymous. The definition of a fallacious perception is: a cognition that is mistaken with regard to its appearing object. Dignāga's *Compendium of Valid Cognition* says:

> Mistaken cognition, conventional consciousness,
> inference, that which arises from inference,
> recollection, and desire, along with [perceptions distorted by an] eye disorder
> are fallacious perceptions. [92]

Here fallacious perception is presented in terms of seven categories, in the following order: (1) mistaken conceptual cognition, such as a conceptual cognition apprehending a mirage to be water, (2) conventional conceptual cognition, such as a conceptual cognition apprehending a gross composite object or a continuum, (3) conceptual cognition of an inference, such as the conceptual cognition apprehending a reason, (4) conceptual cognition that arises from an inference, such as an inferential understanding based on reasoning, (5) conceptual cognition that is recollection, such as a conceptual cognition remembering a past thing, (6) conceptual cognition that aspires to something, such as a conceptual cognition wishing to actualize something in the future, (7) nonconceptual fallacious perception, such as a sense consciousness to which falling hairs appear when the eye is afflicted by a disorder, and so on.

A conceptual cognition apprehending a reason is called an *inference*; this is because the thought apprehending a reason is the cause of its resultant inferential understanding based on reasoning, so the name of the result is applied to its cause. In Dharmakīrti's *Exposition of Valid Cognition*, however, these seven types of fallacious perception are subsumed into four classes: (1) a mind that is based on a linguistic convention, (2) a mind that superimposes something else onto its object, (3) a mind that has a hidden object, [55] and (4) a cognition that arises from an impaired sense faculty as its basis. The first three of these

fallacious perceptions are conceptual, whereas the fourth is nonconceptual.[93]

The definition of an unmistaken cognition is: a cognition that is not mistaken with regard to its appearing object. According to the Sautrāntika and the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka systems, direct perception is unmistaken. So for them, a visual cognition of blue is an unmistaken cognition. Conceptual cognitions mistake their object's universal for the object itself, thus they are necessarily mistaken cognitions, no matter whether they are mistaken or unmistaken regarding their object as cognized. If a nonconceptual consciousness is unmistaken regarding its object as cognized, then it must be unmistaken regarding its appearing object. Therefore if a cognition is unmistaken, it must be a nonconceptual consciousness. Also, since directly perceiving subsequent cognitions and indeterminate perceptions are also unmistaken cognitions, unmistaken cognitions need not necessarily be valid cognitions.

According to the Cittamātra, the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka systems, visual cognitions apprehending blue and so on are mistaken cognitions because they are distorted by a deeper cause of error. As for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, they consider all conceptual and nonconceptual cognitions within the mindstreams of ordinary beings to be mistaken cognitions, yet they also maintain that all instances of cognition directly apprehend their own appearances. Subtle distinctions such as these that are drawn by the Prāsaṅgikas will be explained in volumes 3 and 4. [57]

9
Love and Compassion

HERE, TO EXPAND on the presentation of the eleven virtuous mental factors above, we now discuss love and compassion. As for the benefits of love and compassion, they accrue initially to the person in whom they arise. For instance, when kindhearted attitudes such as love, compassion, and forbearance arise and are sustained within one's mindstream, they reduce one's fear and boost one's confidence. In these and other ways, they increase one's inner strength. Love and compassion arouse a feeling of close connection with others as well as a sense of purpose and meaning in life; they also give one respite in difficult times.

It is true for all people, no matter who they are, that when they generate a kindhearted attitude toward others, their own life becomes happier. This attitude can also bring a greater sense of ease and more peace in the community within which they live. So if each individual is able to accord greater importance to his or her own ethical behavior and make qualities like love, compassion, forbearance, and so on an inseparable part of his or her own life, [100] then this will definitely produce the most wonderful results.

As human beings, we are born into and grow up under the loving care of our parents, and the powerful feeling of affectionate love during our youth remains in our lifeblood. Medical scientists have demonstrated with empirical evidence that when there is a strong feeling of loving kindness, happiness, and peace of mind in a person's life, it enhances physical health; and likewise a mind constantly agitated undermines physical health.

Love and compassion are values we all appreciate quite naturally without having to be told to by other people. Not only are they precious qualities of our minds, but they are also the basic sources of happiness for us as individual people and are the ground of social harmony. Therefore, whether one is seeking happiness for one's own sake or seeking happiness for others, one must practice love and compassion. Furthermore, having a motivation of kindness is the root of kind behavior; when one turns one's mind toward the well-being of others based on a pure altruistic motivation, one's own behavior naturally becomes flawless from the standpoint of ethical conduct. Therefore love and compassion definitely constitute the primary foundation that underpins all the paths of good ethical behavior. Also, what we call *peace* is not simply a matter of not harming other people but is also clearly an expression of loving kindness. [101]

Since the root of human happiness is loving kindness, all the major religious traditions in the world have teachings that focus on the practice of loving kindness. Just as people appreciate kindness, animals do as well. The most precious treasure a person can possess is a kind heart. To be helpful, good-natured, and kindhearted to others is the essence of human life, and when these are absent, life has no meaning.

Loving kindness is not something we have no means to generate. The potential for loving kindness exists within the continuum of every human being simply by virtue of the type of physical body we have. We need to nurture and enhance this potential using our intelligence. We need to develop loving kindness not only toward humans but also toward other living beings. Even if someone has no religious faith, he or she must be able to recognize that love and compassion are extremely important and profoundly helpful in one's life. Although we have strong feelings and experiences of loving kindness when we are very young, as we grow older and as time goes by, all sorts of internal factors and forces within our environment hinder the potential of loving kindness within us. Whether we are religious or not, we must surely understand that loving kindness is needed for our own happiness as well as for the happiness of our family and society, and that loving kindness is what gives rise to peace and happiness in the mind. [102]

In general, love and compassion are differentiated on two levels. First is the affectionate love that arises as a factor of physical development, like the love expressed by a mother carrying her infant child. The second level is when one has generated that natural affection and then enhanced it through extensive meditative cultivation so as to make one's love and compassion universal. To give rise to the latter, we must adopt an unbiased gaze, not paying attention to whether someone is master or servant, rich or poor, educated or uneducated, strong or weak, fair or dark skinned. It is most important to recognize that all of the nearly eight billion people in this world are the same in being human; everyone is the same in wanting happiness and not wanting suffering. When we have this type of understanding, notions of "us and them," and minds of attachment and hatred based on them, can diminish.

There are two ways of viewing others. One is to see that everyone is the same in wanting happiness and not wanting suffering and so to view everyone as one people. The other way to view others is in terms of their differences, such as of nationality, country, ethnicity, language, wealth, poverty, education, religious tradition, and so on. The first way of viewing others does not give rise to attachment and hatred in our minds, whereas the second way of viewing gives rise to biased attitudes of "us versus them," which provide the basis for notions of friend and foe. Although love may arise (for some) on the basis of discriminatory feelings of "me versus you," [103] it would be a biased type of affectionate love. And where affectionate love is biased, hatred can arise as well. It is on the basis of such biased attitudes that attachment toward one's own side and suspicion toward the other side, as well as resentment and ill will, can arise. In contrast, love that arises out of simply considering someone to be just another human being is an unbiased type of loving kindness. So the love that we need to develop is the loving kindness that arises in dependence on recognizing someone to be a human being just like ourselves. Accordingly, Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Knowledge* says: "Adopt an attitude of sameness toward sentient beings."[162] Likewise, Haribhadra's *Short Commentary on the Ornament for Clear Knowledge* says: "Adopt an attitude of sameness toward all sentient beings." [163]

Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

In that both myself and others
are the same in wanting happiness,
what is so special about me
that I strive for my happiness alone?

In that both myself and others
are the same in not wanting suffering,
what is so special about me
that I protect myself but not others? [164]

In that there is no difference between oneself and others — since both are alike in wanting to be happy — it becomes unreasonable to strive for one's own happiness alone and not to strive for others' happiness. [104] Similarly, in that there is no difference between oneself and others — since both are alike in not wanting to suffer — it is unreasonable to guard one's own happiness alone and not to guard the happiness of others. This is what Śāntideva declares in the above verses.

Furthermore, when we understand the way in which human beings live in mutual dependence on one another, this too can give rise to unbiased loving kindness toward others. Human society survives through community and not through each individual living in isolation. Even if we just look at the constitution of the physical body, an individual's happiness necessarily arises in dependence on others. Thus throughout all of human society, from large units like nations to smaller units like single households, among all our needs — education, health, commerce and wealth, food, drink, clothing, utensils, and so on — not a single thing is not dependent on others. Given this fact of our existence, if we continue to despise or mistrust one another, deceive one another, and hurt one another, then there is no possibility for us to attain happiness.

Nowadays, all over the world, one finds the belief that happiness is increased through mere material progress and that this is the root cause of a happy human life. But even with the best possible material conditions, if everyone's mind is filled with self-centeredness, attachment, anger, pride, ill will, jealousy, rivalry, expectation, fear, prejudice, and so on, [105] then no one can have a happy life. Conversely, even without the best material

conditions, if everyone has a subdued, peaceful mind — an attitude that cherishes others and is helpful, content, loving, tolerant, and so on — then everyone will have a happy life. Thus there is no denying that a happy or unhappy life depends mainly on one's attitude. The causes of happiness are produced within each person's mind. If people in individual households have no mental happiness, then it will be difficult for those households, and the societies that they comprise, to find a path to happiness.

The conditions that produce so many of the human-made problems in our world these days are greed, competitiveness, resentment, ill will, pride, jealousy, attachment, hatred, and so on, and the root of these is none other than the self-grasping thought of "me" and self-centeredness. *Exposition of Valid Cognition* says:

> When there is "self," there is a notion of "other";
> from the distinction between self and other comes attachment and hatred;
> fully linked with these two,
> all faults arise. [165]

When there is self-grasping, an exaggerated notion of the "other" occurs. From this arises a division into essentially distinct partitions or categories of "self" and "others." This gives rise to grasping and attachment to one's own side and hatred toward the others' side. When one's mindstream is linked with these mental factors of attachment and hatred, [106] all the faults such as killing and stealing occur. Similarly, *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> All those who are happy in the world
> are so from wanting others to be happy.
> All those who suffer in the world
> are so from wanting themselves to be happy. [166]

All the various types of happiness in the world come from benefiting others and wanting others to be happy. All the various types of suffering in

the world come from wanting oneself to be happy, which is self-centeredness and self-grasping. Therefore one must counteract self-centeredness and self-grasping from a variety of angles.

In brief, people's verbal and physical conduct is classified as good or bad from the point of view of motivation, even down to the smallest deed. The crucial point is that when engaging in any action, whether large or small, one must first generate a good motivation. The way for all people born in this world to attain happiness is to turn our backs on all disharmony based on race, philosophical view, religious tradition, and so on. This is a crucial cause of enhancing good conduct among all races and nations regardless of their religious traditions. We should understand "good conduct" to mean not harming others through one's own body, speech, or mind. [107]

Since this worldwide human society must live in mutual dependence, it is extremely important to create a society that lives with love and affection, like a family sharing food and drink in equal measure. Mentally, we need to take up the responsibility of abandoning hatred and ill will toward the human race on which each of us depends.

Love

In the Buddhist texts, love and forbearance are recognized as the two antidotes against hatred. Of these, we will first explore love more specifically. Among the fifty-one mental factors, both compassion and love are in the nature of the mental factor referred to as *nonhatred*. Yet there is a difference between them. Compassion arises from observing sentient beings to be suffering and has the aspect of wishing them to be free of that. Love, on the other hand, arises upon observing sentient beings from the perspective of their well-being and has the aspect of wishing them to be happy.

The definition of love is: a mental factor that, having observed sentient beings, thinks how wonderful it would be if they had happiness and wishes for them to have it. The *Concentration Combining All Merit Sūtra* says: "*Love* is to think 'May all sentient beings be happy.'"[167] [108] The function of love is to help pacify resentment, rage, and ill will toward sentient beings. Furthermore, the *Teachings of Akṣayamati Sūtra* says: "Love protects oneself and consistently benefits others, for it is supremely nonargumentative and thoroughly destroys all the severe faults of ill will, rage, and resentment." [168]

Moreover, it acts as an antidote to hatred and functions as a basis for not engaging in bad conduct. Pṛthivībandhu's *Explanation about the Five Aggregates* says:

> Love that engages in benefiting sentient beings is indeed the antidote to hatred. It also functions as a basis for not engaging in bad conduct, for when nonhatred is present, there is no engaging in evil actions such as killing and so on.[169]

The results of love are pacification of jealousy, of rivalry, and of ill will. Also, one has mental happiness, courage, great inner strength and confidence, and enduring tolerance. And with mental peace and happiness, one's blood circulation and respiratory flow become even — based on

which one has a healthy body, a long life, and so on. The *Sūtra on the Application of Mindfulness* says:

> Wishing to benefit all sentient beings, [109] one's blood becomes very clear; owing to one's blood becoming very clear, the color of one's face becomes clear; owing to the color of one's face becoming clear, one becomes fair to behold. Owing to this, all sentient beings become joyful in this present life. This can be experienced directly. [170]

Forbearance

To explain what forbearance is, the *Play of Mañjuśrī Sūtra* says:

> Mañjuśrī asked, "Daughter, how do you explain *nonhatred*?"
>
> His spiritual daughter replied, "O Mañjuśrī, it is that which stops animosity arising in the mind and prevents the harming of any object; this I understand to be *forbearance*."[171]

Candrakīrti's *Entering the Middle Way* says:

> Giving is the essence of the perfection of generosity;
> absence of anguish is the essence of ethical discipline;
> nonhatred is the essence of forbearance. [172]

In defining the essence of generosity and so on, Candrakīrti identifies forbearance in terms of nonhatred, or a state of mind that is not perturbed in the face of suffering or harm.

Three kinds of forbearance are outlined in [110] *Commentary on Difficult Points in Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds*. "Forbearance consists of three kinds, which are presented as follows in the *Compendium of Teachings Sūtra*: the forbearance of consciously accepting suffering, the forbearance of certitude in contemplating the nature of reality, and the forbearance of disregarding harm done by others." [173]

(1) The forbearance of consciously accepting suffering refers to accepting with equanimity painful circumstances from which one cannot escape, such as great difficulty and hardship in one's home life. If you cannot access resilient tolerance when experiencing your own suffering, then consider what *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> If there is a remedy,
> what use is it to feel upset?

If there is no remedy,
what use is it to feel upset? [174]

If there is a remedy for something that causes suffering, then what reason is there to be unhappy? By remedying its immediate cause, that suffering will no longer exist. Conversely, if there is no remedy for it, then what benefit is there in being unhappy? It is as useless as being unhappy with space for being unobstructive.

(2) The forbearance of certitude in contemplating the nature of reality refers to analyzing and contemplating the meaning of the object to be meditated on. [111] For example, while debating, a student of Buddhist philosophy contemplates the meaning of what he or she is debating on. [175]

(3) The forbearance of disregarding harm done by others refers to an attitude of restraint and tolerance when, for example, your enemy and others cause you harm; instead of being angry, you practice forbearance. Anger immediately destroys one's peace of mind, causes psychological imbalance, and results in damage to our immediate environment. By recognizing these faults of anger, we adopt forbearance. We do this by contemplating the faults of anger so that before it has arisen when it arises, we can resist the conditions that fuel the anger.

Of the three types of forbearance, the last occurs in the context of being harmed, whereas the other two may occur in any context. The first two types of forbearance are both present, for example, when we are studying for a long time, in that we are listening single-pointedly to the teachings and contemplating the meaning, and even when we are hiking along a trail, in that we are paying attention to our physical conduct and tolerating hunger and thirst.

To contemplate the benefits of adopting forbearance, the *Sūtra Teaching the Great Compassion of the Tathāgata* says: "Bodhisattvas do not have hatred in their minds; they see all sentient beings as dear and are fond of them."[176] Similarly, the *Sūtra on the Application of Mindfulness* says: "Those with forbearance, having abandoned rage, [112] are in harmony with all living beings; they see those beings as dear and grow fond of them. Those with forbearance become a basis of supreme trust and develop a very radiant appearance and a very radiant mind." [177]

Also, *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> There is no evil like hatred;
> there is no resilience like forbearance. [178]

Śāntideva states that there is no evil like hatred for disturbing the mind and destroying virtue; and there is no resilience like forbearance for destroying the feverish torment of the afflictions.

Candrakīrti's *Entering the Middle Way* says:

> Forbearance brings qualities opposite to those just described.
> Forbearance makes one beautiful, dear to holy beings,
> and skillful in knowing right from wrong. [179]

Here Candrakīrti says that through practicing forbearance, one will attain a beautiful body, be dear to and cherished by holy beings, and become skillful in knowing what is and is not correct, which in this tradition means to become versed in sound moral reasoning. [113]

The practice of forbearance itself is a function of one's own state of mind, as is explained in *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds*:

> Wicked people are as limitless as space;
> there is no possibility of conquering them.
> But if I conquer my mind of anger alone,
> this is like conquering all of my enemies.
>
> Where would enough leather be found
> to cover the entire surface of the earth?
> But if I put leather just on the soles of my shoes,
> this is like covering the whole surface of the earth. [180]

Since wicked people are as limitless as space, it is impossible to overcome them all. Yet overcoming and subduing your mind of anger alone would be like conquering all of your external enemies. As an analogy, if you had to cover the entire surface of the earth with soft leather to protect your feet

from injury by thorns and so on, you would never find enough leather; but if you protected your feet by covering just the soles of your shoes with leather, it would be like covering the entire surface of the earth. The way to cultivate forbearance and so on as an antidote to the fault of hatred is demonstrated superbly in Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds*, so one can learn much about mastering this skill from that text. [114]

The way to cultivate forbearance, the antidote to hatred, is as follows. Contemplate that anger is inappropriate because it yields no benefits and brings serious problems. Say someone harms you, and you become enraged and retaliate. This will not undo the harm they have already done, so what point is there in seeking revenge? Candrakīrti says in *Entering the Middle Way*:

> If you respond with vengeance when someone harms you,
> does your vengeance reverse what was inflicted?
> Vengeance surely serves no purpose in this life. [181]

Furthermore, not wanting to experience future suffering while simultaneously seeking revenge for the harm done to you by others is a contradiction. Responding with harm — through engaging in quarrels, disputes, and so on — damages not only yourself but also your relatives and friends. Also, grave consequences occur in the present and will continue to occur, even so far as losing your life. Therefore, just as you tolerate the pain when a doctor pierces you with a sharp instrument as part of a treatment, so you should cultivate firm tolerance in the face of slight temporary suffering so as to avoid endless long-term pain. Thus by thinking "It is unsuitable to respond with harm," you put a stop to hatred. [115]

Also, some people overwhelmed with mental sickness even harm their doctor, yet their doctor thinks "This is beyond their control," and without getting angry, he tries various methods to cure their mental sickness. Similarly, when an abuser harms you, consider, "He is behaving in this way because he is impelled by mental afflictions beyond his control," and make a distinction between the mental affliction and the person in whose

continuum it arises. So without getting angry at the person, you think "May he be free from mental affliction," and this is how you put a stop to hatred. Āryadeva says in *Four Hundred Stanzas*:

> Just as a doctor does not get angry with
> an enraged person seized by demonic forces,
> the buddhas see mental afflictions as the enemy,
> not the person who has them. [182]

Also, Candrakīrti says in his *Commentary on the Four Hundred Stanzas*:

> Thinking "The fault here is not sentient beings,
> the fault is the mental afflictions,"
> wise ones who have thoroughly analyzed this
> do not get angry with sentient beings. [183]

When someone strikes you, if the appropriate response is to get angry with the one *directly* inflicting the harm, then you should get angry with the stick or other weapon. And if the appropriate response is to get angry with the one *indirectly* inflicting the harm, [116] then since it is anger that incites the attacker, you should get angry with the anger. Either way, it is not appropriate to get angry with the person. *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> If I become angry with the wielder
> who directly employs the stick and so on,
> then since he is impelled only by hatred,
> at worst I should get angry with hatred instead. [184]

If it is the nature of unwise beings to harm others, then it is just as inappropriate to get angry with them as it is with fire for being hot and burning in nature. And if it is but an adventitious fault, then it would be like blaming the sky for being filled with smoke. As *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

If it is the nature of childish beings
to act hurtfully toward others,
then it is as unreasonable to get angry with them
as it is to begrudge a fire for burning.

And if this is an adventitious fault
in beings whose nature is agreeable,
then it is as unreasonable to get angry with them
as it is to blame the sky for bearing smoke. [185]

There are many techniques such as these to destroy the supreme enemy, our anger. So if we use several kinds of reasoning, based on thorough analysis with fine investigative awareness, to prevent the arising of anger, many types of anger will cease, and forbearance will arise in manifold ways. [117]

Compassion

The definition of compassion is: a mental factor that thinks, upon observing other sentient beings, "How wonderful it would be if they were free from the causes of suffering; may they be free from suffering." It functions to counteract violence. Examples are loving kindness that thinks, upon seeing stricken sentient beings tortured by suffering, "How wonderful it would be if they were free from that suffering," and loving kindness that thinks, upon observing sentient beings creating the cause of suffering, "May they be free from that cause." Based on that, the scriptures also explain a special type of compassion that wishes to protect sentient beings by thinking "I myself will free sentient beings from suffering." The *Concentration Combining All Merit Sūtra* says: "That which completely frees all sentient beings from every suffering is great compassion."[186]

The Sanskrit word for compassion is *karuṇā*, and here the syllable *kaṃ* means "happiness" and the syllable *ruṇa* means "block." This indicates that when one sees the specific sufferings of others, it is unbearable and can block one's own happiness. Therefore *karuṇā* means "blocking happiness."[187] [118] The function of compassion is to counteract violence toward sentient beings. The *Explanation of the Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is nonviolence? Associated with nonhatred, it is the mind of compassion itself; it functions to counteract violence."[188] Then the *Treasury of Knowledge Autocommentary* says: "Love is in the nature of nonhatred" and "Compassion too is like that."[189] As stated above, among the fifty-one mental factors, both love and compassion are in the nature of the mental factor nonhatred. Yet there is a difference between them. Compassion arises upon observing sentient beings to be suffering and has the aspect of wishing them to be free of that. Love arises upon observing sentient beings in terms of their happiness and has the aspect of wishing them to possess that.

As for the cause of generating compassion, this includes: recognizing that one must not abandon other sentient beings, since oneself and other sentient beings are equal in wanting happiness and not wanting suffering;

recognizing how other sentient beings have been one's relatives from the distant past; contemplating how they are tortured by various sufferings; reflecting deeply on how one's own happiness and suffering are the results of benefiting or harming other sentient beings; and so on.

The *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra in Twenty-Five Thousand Lines* says, "Regarding all sentient beings, one must think of them as one's mother, father, brother, sister, friend, relative, family member." [190] [119] Many sūtras and commentaries say that such a teaching — that one must think of all sentient beings as one's relatives and friends — is the cause of compassion. Thinking of sentient beings as our relatives is intended to train the mind in compassion, as in the case of seeing a neutral person with whom we have no special relationship or seeing someone who harms us, such as an enemy. In general we do not need to train in compassion toward our dear relatives or toward a child tormented by grief at the loss of his or her mother. Compassion arises naturally in such contexts. Say we are training in a compassionate attitude toward neutral persons. We cultivate the thought of them as family members to help generate the feeling of finding their suffering unbearable when we see them in that state. This is because without finding their suffering unbearable, compassion for them will not arise.

Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* does not stress the cultivation of recognizing other sentient beings as one's relatives and instead emphasizes training the mind in equanimity — that oneself and others are the same in wanting happiness and in not wanting suffering. It is on such a basis that the contemplation of exchanging the self and others is generated. This is a unique instruction for training the mind in compassion, and one should develop an understanding of it from this source. [120]

The results of compassion are as mentioned in the *Sūtra on the Application of Mindfulness*:

> That which is called *compassion* sees all beings as dear, it enables all beings to trust, it is the foundation of faith for those who fear the terrors of saṃsāra, it places beyond

> sorrow those who have good mental discipline, and it is the basis of refuge for those who lack protection. [191]

The *King of Concentrations Sūtra* says:

> It makes one kind, excellent in demeanor, and always serene;
> it benefits oneself as well as other sentient beings;
> so one should cultivate love and compassion. [192]

In general the scriptures speak of five types of virtue: (1) ultimate virtue, (2) virtue by its essential nature, (3) virtue through concomitance, (4) virtue owing to motivation, and (5) virtue through relationship. The eleven virtuous mental factors listed above are characterized as being *virtue by their essential nature*, in that their being virtuous is not contingent on some other factor, such as an underlying motivation or some concomitant factor. They are virtuous by their very existence. *Ultimate virtue* is identified in terms of ultimate reality, and it is so called because when one meditates by taking ultimate reality as one's focus, it gradually leads to the removal of all the mental obscurations. It is therefore not an actual virtue; it is just given the name *virtue*. [121] *Virtue through concomitance* refers to any minds or mental factors that have arisen as concomitant factors to any of the eleven virtuous mental factors of faith and so on. *Virtue owing to motivation* refers to being motivated by compassion and so forth in one's physical and verbal actions. *Virtue through relationship* refers to virtuous latent potencies and so on.

10
Mental Afflictions

The Six Root Mental Afflictions

THE FIFTH SECTION presents the six root mental afflictions: (1) attachment, (2) anger, (3) pride, (4) afflictive ignorance, (5) afflictive doubt, (6) afflictive view.

Here is the *Verse Summary*:

> The six root afflictions are thus:
> attachment, anger, pride,
> ignorance, doubt, and afflictive view.

The definition of a mental affliction in general is: a mental factor that functions to disturb the mindstream of the person in whose continuum it occurs. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "The definition of a mental affliction is: any factor that, upon arising, arises with the characteristic of being thoroughly disturbing, so that through its arising, the mindstream arises as thoroughly disturbed."[193] Yaśomitra's *Explanation of the Compendium of Knowledge* says: "The characteristic of being thoroughly disturbing should be understood as the definition of mental afflictions in general. [122] There are six types of disturbance: (1) disturbance due to distraction, (2) disturbance due to distortion, (3) disturbance due to excitation, (4) disturbance due to dullness, (5) disturbance due to heedlessness, and (6) disturbance due to non-refraining." [194]

The first of the six root mental afflictions is *attachment*. This mental factor keenly seeks to acquire something contaminated on account of conceiving it to be intrinsically attractive. Also, upon seeing a physical body, food, clothing, jewelry, and so on as something attractive, it fixates on what was seen and does not want to be separated from it. Afflictions other than attachment are relatively easier to remove from the mind, just as, by analogy, it is relatively easy to remove dirt from a dry cloth. Attachment, in contrast, is as difficult to remove as dirt from an oil-soaked cloth. It clings to its object and gives rise to other afflictions. Thus attachment is a mental factor that is very difficult to remove on account of increasing one's fixation on objects of desire, intensifying longing to see, touch, and do such things with its chosen objects.

The function of attachment is to produce its resultant suffering. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is attachment? It is desire pertaining to the three realms. It functions to give rise to suffering."[195] [123]

There is, in general, no difference between attachment and *craving*. There are three types of craving: craving for the desirable, craving for dissolution, and craving for continued existence. The first is attachment that longs for happiness and wishes not to be separated from it. The second is craving for dissolution out of fear of pain, thinking "Oh, how I wish I would die" or "How I wish this did not exist or that would not happen," and such like. The third is craving for continued existence, such as attachment to one's own aggregates of body and mind. When that very craving becomes more intense and has the power to proliferate saṃsāra, then it is called *grasping* (or *appropriation*). As a provisional antidote against attachment, one needs to meditate on ugliness, and the way to do this will be discussed later in the section on how to engage in the meditative application of mindfulness.

The second root mental affliction is *anger*. This is a mental factor that, upon perceiving any of the three objects of anger, arises as intolerance and hostility wishing to cause harm. It has the aspect of a very harsh mind that perceives the enemy as repellent and so on. [196] For example, when someone speaks to us with harsh words, intolerance immediately arises in the mind. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is anger? It is hostility

toward sentient beings, manifest suffering, or things that cause suffering. It functions as a basis for unhappy states and for bad conduct." [197] There are three types of objects of anger: sentient beings, one's own suffering, and circumstances that produce suffering, such as thorns and weapons. [124]

As for objects that induce anger, the sūtras teach nine basic causes of hostility. These are stated in Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland*:

> Ill will arises from nine causes:
> it is the intent to harm others on the part of one
> who is worried about some misfortune in the three times
> involving past harm, present harm, or possible future harm
> in regard to oneself, one's friends, or one's enemies. [198]

This passage explains that there are nine types of worry in this context: worry about whether one has been harmed by someone in the past, is being harmed by them in the present, or will be harmed by them in the future; worry about whether one's relatives have been harmed by someone in the past, are being harmed by them in the present, or will be harmed by them in the future; and worry about whether one's enemies have been benefited by someone in the past, are being benefited by them in the present, or will be benefited by them in the future.

The function and faults of anger are explained in *Sūtra on the Application of Mindfulness*:

> When anger arises, and for as long as it lasts, it makes a person's heart-mind burn; it alters his appearance; it distorts the blood vessels in his face; it makes him knowingly heedless toward others; it generates fear in worldly beings; it continuously creates defilement, unpleasantness, and disharmony again and again in all places and lands. [199] [125]

Many evil consequences are explained in scriptures such as this. A person under the influence of anger in this life becomes an unsuitable basis of virtue; the color of his face becomes unappealing; others will see him as

reckless; it creates disharmony among all peoples; it makes everyone appear ugly; and it causes the three gateways of behavior — body, speech, and mind — to become defiled. *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> When pierced by painful thoughts of hatred,
> the mind experiences no peace.
> Finding neither joy nor happiness,
> it becomes unsettled and cannot sleep.
>
> Those reliant upon a master,
> though honored by him with wealth and status,
> may nevertheless wish to kill him
> if that master is repugnantly filled with anger.
>
> Even his friends are disenchanted;
> though he gives gifts, he is not approached.
> In brief, there is nobody at all
> who lives happily with anger.
>
> Sufferings such as these are
> created by the enemy: anger. [200]

In that it produces vehement suffering, hatred is like a stabbing pain. When in the grip of thoughts of hatred, neither physical pleasure nor mental joy can pacify such suffering. Sleep will not come, and the mind refuses to relax and settle. When overpowered by anger, [126] even those masters who kindly sustain one with wealth and status might get killed. Even their friends become wearied and disenchanted. Other people may be attracted by gifts, but they are not happy to stay. In brief, there is no opportunity for someone under the sway of anger to live happily. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to put a stop to anger by thinking that anger must not be given an opening. This has already been explained extensively in the section on love.

The third root mental affliction is *pride*. This is a mental factor that has the aspect of a grandiose mind caused by perceiving all kinds of

excellent personal attributes, such as one's good qualities, wealth, and so on. It is an inflation of the mind that arises upon perceiving anything such as one's own power, acquisitions, social class, family lineage, and good qualities — or even just a pleasant voice or great strength. Just as when seen from a high mountain peak, other people below appear very small, this mental factor has an aspect of loftiness holding oneself to be superior and others to be inferior.

Pride functions as a basis for the arising of suffering in that it causes one to disrespect others and prevents one from developing higher qualities. We are advised to meditate on the groups of elements as an antidote to intellectual pride, to reflect on the good qualities of exceptional beings superior to oneself, and to contemplate the vast number of things one does not know. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: [127] "What is pride? It is a grandiose mind based on the view of the perishable collection (Skt. *satkāyadṛṣṭi*). It functions as a basis for being disrespectful and for the arising of suffering." [201] Here "based on the view of the perishable collection" indicates that every time pride arises, it arises in dependence on an innate self-grasping attitude thinking "me" in the mindstream.

When categorized, pride has seven divisions: pride, pride of superiority, excessive pride, pride of thinking "me," pretentious pride, emulating pride, distorted pride. *Pride* is a grandiose mind thinking "I am better than this one who is considered inferior to me." *Pride of superiority* is a grandiose mind thinking "I am better than this one who is considered my equal." *Excessive pride* is a grandiose mind thinking "I am better than this one who is considered superior to me." *Pride of thinking "me"* is a grandiose mind that, based on perceiving one's own aggregates, thinks "me." *Pretentious pride* is a grandiose mind that believes oneself to have attained good qualities that one has not attained. *Emulating pride* is a grandiose mind that, having perceived someone who is very much superior to oneself, thinks "I am only slightly inferior to this person." *Distorted pride* is a grandiose mind that believes what is not a good quality within oneself to be a good quality. Alternatively, *Precious Garland* says:

> Any deriding of oneself, [128]

thinking "I am useless,"
is the pride of inferiority. [202]

Deriding oneself, thinking "There is no purpose in my being alive," is the pride of inferiority.

The fourth root mental affliction is *ignorance*. In general, just as in expressions like "not seeing," "not knowing," the Sanskrit word *avidyā* (for "ignorance") is a term wherein the word *vidyā* ("knowing") is conjoined with a negative particle. So the negative particle in the word for ignorance (*avidyā*) functions in exactly the same manner as those in "not knowing," "not seeing," "not understanding," and being "unclear." For example, when one closes one's eyes and everything becomes black or covered in darkness, this prevents one from seeing any external forms and so on. In the same manner, ignorance prevents one from understanding the way things exist. So the definition of ignorance is: a mental factor that engages its object in a confused manner. However, the *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is ignorance? It is an absence of knowing within the three realms. It functions as the basis for the distorted ascertainment of things, doubt, and all that is thoroughly afflictive." [203]

Ignorance can be understood in two different forms: as a mental factor that is the confusion consisting in the absence of knowing or as a cognition that apprehends in a distorted manner. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu consider ignorance to be a mental factor that is primarily the absence of knowing. Dharmakīrti and others, in contrast, consider ignorance to be a confusion that involves distorted apprehension. Thus the first interpretation understands ignorance to be [129] a form of non-cognition, whereas the latter understands it to be a form of mis-cognition. That said, both interpretations converge on identifying the wisdom realizing the ultimate nature of reality to be the opposite of ignorance as well as the principal antidote that counters ignorance. The *Compendium of Ascertainments* says: "Ignorance is defined as not cognizing reality as it is. Given that afflictive views do not cognize reality as it is, they are defined as adhering to a distorted nature." [204] *Exposition of Valid Cognition* says:

Ignorance is distorted cognition

because it opposes wisdom,
because it is cognitive due to being a mental factor,
and because [the Buddha] said [that this was the case].
Any other explanation is not correct. [205]

The function of ignorance is as follows. In dependence on ignorance, other mental afflictions arise; in dependence on those, karma is created; and in dependence on karma, suffering arises. Thus ignorance functions as the basis for the arising of all mental afflictions and faults. *Exposition of Valid Cognition* says:

Every type of fault arises from
the view of [“me” and “mine” in] the perishable collection.
That view is ignorance; when it is present, there is attachment to that [“me” and “mine”],
and from that attachment hatred and so on arise. [130]
Due to this, the cause of faults is said to be ignorance. [206]

Candrakīrti’s *Entering the Middle Way* says:

Seeing with wisdom that all afflictions and faults
arise from the view of the perishable collection . . . [207]

A detailed explanation of this will be given below when presenting the causes and conditions of the mental afflictions.

The fifth root mental affliction is *afflictive doubt*. This is a mental factor of doubt that, upon considering any of the four truths, cause and effect, and so on, wavers between two standpoints. For example, one may have wavering doubt, thinking, “Is the self impermanent or not?” Now suppose you want to travel along a road. If you doubt whether it is the right road, this creates an obstacle to your following it. Similarly, afflictive doubt creates an obstacle to seeing the way in which things exist and so on. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: “What is doubt? It is to be of two minds about the truths and so on. It functions as a basis for not engaging in virtue.” [208]

Afflictive doubt functions to prevent engaging in virtue and abandoning nonvirtue as appropriate. In general, there are many types of doubt, not all of them afflictive: we may wonder if this man is Tashi or not, [131] or what the weather will be like tomorrow, or if this is Tsering's house.

The sixth root mental affliction is *afflictive view*, of which there are five types: (1) view of the perishable collection, (2) view holding to an extreme, (3) wrong view, (4) holding views to be supreme, and (5) holding ethics and vows to be supreme. The *view of the perishable collection* is an afflictive intelligence that, focused on "me" or "mine" within one's own continuum, thinks of "me" or "mine" as autonomously "me" or "mine." For example, it is an apprehension of an exaggerated sense of "me" that arises in the depths of your heart when someone praises you, or criticizes you, and so on, and you think "Why me?" This mind is called "view of the perishable collection" because it views "me" or "mine" on the basis of the aggregates that are assembling and disintegrating. [209] The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is the view of the perishable collection? It is any acquiescing, desiring, discriminating, conceiving, or viewing that views the five aggregates of appropriation as the self or as belonging to the self. It functions as the basis of all views." [210] Here where the *Compendium of Knowledge* explains the definition of the view of the perishable collection, the meaning of acquiescing and so on is as follows. *Acquiescing* means not being wary of a distorted meaning, *desiring* means engaging its object distortedly, *discriminating* means fully differentiating its object, *conceiving* means actively adhering to its object, *viewing* means perceiving its object. [132]

A *view holding to an extreme* is an afflictive intelligence that grasps the focal object of the view of the perishable collection as either permanent or annihilated. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is the view holding to an extreme? It is any acquiescing and so on that views the five aggregates of appropriation as either permanent or annihilated." [211] This falling to an extreme that views something as permanent or as annihilated is the main obstacle to making progress on the Middle Way, which is free from the extremes of viewing as permanent and viewing as

annihilated. When categorized, the view holding to an extreme has two types: the view of permanence and the view of annihilation.

Wrong view is an afflictive intelligence that, upon considering something that exists — such as karmic cause and effect, action and agent, and so on — views it to be nonexistent. It functions to make one behave perversely regarding what to take up or cast aside, such as avoiding virtue and severing the roots of virtue as well as engaging in nonvirtue and welcoming evil intention. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is wrong view? To denigrate the functioning of causes, effects, and agents and to deny things that actually exist is an acquiescence and so on that conceives distortedly." [212]

Holding views to be supreme is an afflictive intelligence that, focused on other pernicious views or the aggregates based on which pernicious views arise, [133] holds either of these to be supreme. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is holding views to be supreme? It is any acquiescing and so on that views those views, or indeed the five aggregates of appropriation that are the basis of those views, to be supreme, principal, superior, and sacred." [213] Here the meaning of listing "supreme" and so on is as follows. Holding something as *supreme* means believing it to be the most excellent, holding it as *principal* means believing it to be unsurpassed by others, holding it as *superior* means believing it to be superior to others, viewing it as *sacred* means believing it to be unmatched by others.

Holding ethics and vows to be supreme is an afflictive intelligence that is focused on defective ethics motivated by a wrong view, on a vow involving improper ethics, on defective austerities of body and speech, or on the aggregates they are based upon. This view, taking one of these as its object, views it to be the cause of purification and liberation — that is, to be supreme. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is holding ethics and vows to be supreme? It is any acquiescing and so on that views ethics and vows, or the five aggregates of appropriation that are the basis of ethics and vows, to be purifying, liberating, and definitively releasing." [214] [134]

These five views and the five nonview afflictions — attachment, anger, pride, ignorance, doubt — are called *root mental afflictions* because there

are no secondary mental afflictions that do not arise from one of these ten. Also, secondary mental afflictions are secondary to one of these ten, and given that these are the primary causes of the mind being afflictive, they are called *root mental afflictions*.

The Twenty Secondary Mental Afflictions

The sixth section presents the twenty secondary mental afflictions as follows: (1) rage, (2) resentment, (3) concealment, (4) spite, (5) jealousy, (6) avarice, (7) pretense, (8) guile, (9) arrogance, (10) violence, (11) shamelessness, (12) nonembarrassment, (13) dullness, (14) excitation, (15) faithlessness, (16) laziness, (17) heedlessness, (18) forgetfulness, (19) lack of meta-awareness, and (20) distraction. Here is the *Verse Summary*:

> The twenty secondary ones are thus:
> Rage, resentment, concealment,
> spite, jealousy, avarice, pretense,
> guile, arrogance, violence, shamelessness,
> nonembarrassment, dullness, excitation,
> faithlessness, laziness, heedlessness,
> forgetfulness, lack of meta-awareness,
> and distraction, making twenty.

The first is *rage*. This is a mental factor associated with anger that is the wish to inflict harm when any of the nine basic causes of hostility are present. [135] The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is rage? It is an attitude that is hostile when a cause of ill will is present, since it is a mind that is associated with anger. It functions as a basis for taking up weapons, punishing, and so on, and preparing to harm."[215] What is the difference between anger and rage? Anger is a disturbance within the depths of the heart that is intolerant of the object of anger even when the object merely appears in the mind without being actually present; it is like igniting a fire. Rage is an amplification of anger, wanting to physically beat and so on when a basic cause of rage is present; it is like a fire when butter is poured onto it, blazing with tongues of flames.

The second is *resentment*. This is a mental factor associated with anger that does not let go of the wish to respond with harm. Since it firmly holds a continuous grudge, it is called *resentment*, or literally, *holding a grudge*.

The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is resentment? Associated with anger and following in its wake, it does not let go of an intention to retaliate. It functions as a basis for intolerance." [216]

The third is *concealment*. This is a mental factor associated with delusion that wants to hide one's misdeeds or keep them secret when others mention them out of a wish to help. It has the function of directly causing regret and indirectly [136] causing unhappiness or a wretched state. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is concealment? Associated with delusion, it keeps secret one's misdeeds when one is rightly confronted. It functions as a basis for regret and a wretched state."[217]

The fourth is *spite*. This is a mental factor that has no intention of regretting and confessing one's own faults when they are mentioned by others but, with animosity empowered by rage and resentment, wants to utter harsh words. It functions to generate misery by doing many unsuitable things, such as uttering harsh words. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is spite? Associated with anger, it is a thoroughly hostile attitude that is preceded by a mind of anger and resentment. It functions as a basis of wrath, as well as harsh, insulting words, and to increase demerit and a state of wretchedness." [218]

The fifth is *jealousy*. This is a mental factor associated with hatred that, out of attachment to gain and respect, is an inner disturbance of mind unable to bear the success of others. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is jealousy? [137] Associated with hatred, it is an inner disturbance of mind that, out of excessive attachment to gain and respect, cannot bear the notable success of others. It functions to cause unhappiness and wretched states."[219] When jealousy is categorized there are two types: jealousy of someone perceived to be equal to oneself and jealousy of someone perceived to be superior to oneself. It is called *jealousy* (*phrag dog*) because jealousy is a narrowing and contraction of the mind — literally, in Tibetan, a narrowing (*dog*) of the in-between space (*phrag*).

The sixth is *avarice*. Associated with attachment, this is a mental factor that, out of attachment to gain and respect, wants to hold on to things and cannot let go of them. It functions to accumulate unnecessary things without allowing them to decrease. The phrase "not allowing

unnecessary things to decrease" means to accumulate unneeded things without reducing them. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is avarice? Associated with attachment, it is a mind that firmly holds on to things out of excessive attachment to gain and respect. It functions as a basis for not allowing unnecessary things to decrease." [220]

The seventh is *pretense*. Associated with attachment or delusion, this is a mental factor that, out of attachment to gain and respect, wants to show, with an intention to deceive others, that one has good qualities that one does not actually have. It functions to establish wrong livelihood. [138] The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is pretense? Associated with attachment and delusion, this is a mental factor that, out of excessive attachment to gain and respect, displays what is not a genuine quality. It functions as a basis of wrong livelihood." [221]

The eighth is *guile*. Associated with attachment or delusion, this is a mental factor that, out of attachment to gain and respect, wants to mislead others and make them unaware of one's faults. It functions to prevent one from obtaining correct advice. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is guile? Associated with attachment and delusion, it is a mental factor that, out of excessive attachment to gain and respect, treats faults as good qualities. It functions to prevent one from obtaining correct advice."[222]

The ninth is *arrogance*. Associated with attachment, it is a mental factor that, upon seeing any signs of contaminated good fortune in oneself, such as good health, inflates the mind with joy and mental bliss. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is arrogance? It is joy and mental bliss associated with attachment that arises [139] upon seeing any signs of long life and contaminated good fortune based on good health and youth. It functions to assist all the root and secondary mental afflictions." [223] Regarding the function of arrogance, the *Sūtra Invoking the Supreme Intention* says:

> Arrogance is the root of all heedlessness. [224]

Arrogance functions as the basis of all root and secondary mental afflictions, such as heedlessness and so on.

The tenth is *violence*. Associated with anger, this is a mental factor that, in opposition to loving kindness and so on, wants to inflict injury on others. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is violence? Associated with anger, it is to be unloving, uncompassionate, and unempathetic. It functions to be thoroughly injurious." [225] Here "unloving" is when one wants to inflict injury, "uncompassionate" is when one wants another to be injured, and "unempathetic" is when one relishes hearing or seeing someone else inflict injury. The function of violence is to injure or to harm. [140]

The eleventh is *shamelessness*. Associated with any of the three poisons, it is a mental factor that does not shun wrongdoing, whether for the sake of oneself or the Dharma. The mental factor shamelessness is the opposite of a sense of shame. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is shamelessness? Associated with attachment, hatred, or delusion, it is to not shun wrongdoing for the sake of oneself. It functions to assist all the root and secondary mental afflictions." [226]

The twelfth is *nonembarrassment*. Associated with any of the three poisons, it is a mental factor that does not shun wrongdoing for the sake of others. Nonembarrassment is the opposite of embarrassment. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is nonembarrassment? Associated with attachment, hatred, and delusion, it is to not shun wrongdoing for the sake of others. It functions to assist all the root and secondary mental afflictions." [227]

The thirteenth is *dullness*. Associated with delusion, it is a mental factor that causes physical and mental heaviness and makes the mind hazy and unserviceable in apprehending the aspects of its object. It functions to increase all the mental afflictions. [141] The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is dullness? Associated with delusion, it is the unserviceability of the mind." [228]

The fourteenth is *excitation*. Associated with attachment, it is a mental factor that, upon seeing attractive characteristics such as those in desirable sense objects, scatters the mind so that it becomes unpeaceful. It functions to prevent the mind from abiding on its object. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is excitation? Associated with attachment, it is a

mind that is disquieted upon beholding attractive characteristics. It functions as a hindrance to calm abiding." [229]

The fifteenth is *faithlessness*. Associated with delusion, it is a mental factor that does not trust, admire, or emulate an object worthy of faith. It functions as a basis for laziness. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is faithlessness? Associated with delusion, it is a mind that does not trust, admire, or emulate virtuous dharmas. It functions as a basis for laziness."[230] [142]

The sixteenth is *laziness*. Associated with delusion, it is a mental factor that, in dependence on sleep and so on, causes the mind to lack enthusiasm for virtue. It functions to reduce the side of virtue. The *Sūtra on the Application of Mindfulness* says:

> The single basis of mental afflictions
> is laziness, for it is present in all afflictions;
> where there is laziness,
> there is no Dharma there. [231]

The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is laziness? Associated with delusion, it is a mind's lack of enthusiasm, based on the pleasures of sleeping, resting, and lying down. It functions to hinder virtuous practice."[232]

When laziness is categorized, there are three types: the laziness of indolence, the laziness of adherence to unwholesome activities, and the laziness of self-disparagement. The laziness of indolence is having no wish to engage in any virtue and allowing it to slip away every moment of the day under the influence of procrastination. The laziness of adherence to unwholesome activities is to cling to worldly activities and so on and not delight in virtue. The laziness of self-disparagement is to deride oneself in thinking, out of indolence, that someone like me cannot accomplish virtue. An example is to think with discouragement, "How can someone like me accomplish the purpose of sentient beings?" *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says: [143]

> Laziness: adherence to unwholesome activities,

indolence, and self-disparagement. [233]

The seventeenth is *heedlessness*. This is a mental factor that, based on any of the three poisons in association with laziness, behaves carelessly without guarding the mind against accumulating mental afflictions and faults. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is heedlessness? Based on attachment, hatred, and delusion in association with laziness, it is to not cultivate virtuous dharmas and not protect the mind from impure dharmas. It functions as a basis for increasing nonvirtue and decreasing virtue." [234]

The eighteenth is *forgetfulness*. This is a mental factor that makes the mind unclear and forgetful of virtue as a result of recollecting the objects of focus of the mental afflictions. It functions to distract the mind toward such objects of focus or toward the ways that mental afflictions apprehend their objects of focus. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is forgetfulness? It is recollection concomitant with mental afflictions. It functions as a basis for distraction." [235]

The nineteenth is *lack of meta-awareness*. This mental factor is an afflictive intelligence that engages in activities of body, speech, or mind without meta-awareness. [144] It thus functions as a basis for evil conduct and moral downfalls. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says: "What is lack of meta-awareness? It is an intelligence concomitant with mental afflictions; it engages in activities of body, speech, and mind without meta-awareness. It functions as a basis for moral downfall." [236]

The twentieth is *distraction*. Associated with any of the three poisons, this is a mental factor that causes the mind to become scattered and distracted from its object of focus. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says:

> What is distraction? Associated with attachment, hatred, or delusion, it is a scattering of the mind. It may be natural distraction, external distraction, internal distraction, distraction involving distinguishing marks, distraction involving nonvirtuous tendencies, or distraction involving attention. [237]

These six of natural distraction and so on are identified as follows: (1) *Natural distraction* refers to the five sense consciousnesses. (2) *External distraction* refers for the most part to mental scattering and excitation. (3) *Internal distraction* refers to gross and subtle laxity and to craving for the delicious experience of concentration. (4) *Distraction involving distinguishing marks* is like the virtuous mental activity of thinking "It would be wonderful if others considered me to be a great meditator" or such like. [145] (5) *Distraction involving nonvirtuous tendencies* refers to the pride of thinking "me." (6) *Distraction involving attention* refers to attention that thinks "Perhaps I should give up the supreme path, or the higher concentrations, and practice the lower ones," or such like. Although these are all called "distraction," they need not be distraction that is a secondary mental affliction. The attributes of gross and subtle laxity and excitation, as well as distraction and so on, are explained in detail in the section on calm abiding (see part 6). The reason that these twenty — from rage to distraction — are called *secondary mental afflictions* is because each of them causes the mind to be afflicted according to whichever root mental affliction it is associated with.

The way in which specific root and specific secondary mental afflictions are or are not concomitant is explained in the *Compendium of Knowledge*:

> Which are the concomitant factors? Attachment is not concomitant with anger; and just as it is not with anger, likewise it is not with doubt. However, it is concomitant with the remaining ones. And just as attachment is not with anger, likewise anger is not concomitant with attachment, or pride, or view. Pride is not concomitant with anger or doubt. Ignorance is of two types: that which is concomitant with all the other mental afflictions and that which is unmixed. Unmixed ignorance is an unknowing of the truths. View is not concomitant with anger or doubt. [146] Doubt is not concomitant with attachment, pride, or view. The secondary mental afflictions of rage and so on are not mutually concomitant. Shamelessness and

> nonembarrassment are concomitant with all nonvirtuous minds. Dullness, excitation, faithlessness, laziness, and heedlessness are concomitant with all the mental afflictions.[238]

Why are attachment and anger not concomitant? Because two contradictory ways of apprehending the object do not accompany one mind simultaneously. Why is attachment not concomitant with doubt? When a mind becomes doubtful, it does not maintain a single position, in which case it cannot be attached to its object. And in the case of the remaining root mental afflictions — pride, ignorance, and view — since attachment does not have a way of apprehending its object that is incompatible with those, they can be concomitant. Why is anger not concomitant with pride and view? Respectively, whatever object animosity may arise toward, the mind does not become inflated on account of that and it does not mistakenly conceive the object in the sense of viewing it.

Why is pride not concomitant with anger? Because two contradictory ways of apprehending the object do not arise simultaneously accompanying one mind. [147] Why is it not concomitant with doubt? Because the mind does not become inflated on account of whatever ambivalent mental experience doubt has.

According to those who assert the foundation consciousness, ignorance is divided into two types: ignorance that is concomitant with all the other mental afflictions and ignorance that is unmixed. [The latter is twofold: ignorance that is unmixed from the point of view of concomitance, and ignorance that is unmixed from the point of view of the basis.] Ignorance that is unmixed from the point of view of concomitance is ignorance that is confused about how the truth exists; it accompanies the sixth mental consciousness (Skt., *manovijñāna*) but is not concomitant with the other root mental afflictions. Ignorance that is unmixed from the point of view of the basis is said to accompany only the afflictive mental consciousness (*kliṣṭamanas*). Most Buddhist masters uphold the standpoint that says this ignorance is concomitant with all the other five root mental afflictions.

Why is view not concomitant with either anger or doubt? This can be understood by means of the above explanation as to why doubt is not

concomitant with attachment, pride, or view.

Why are the secondary mental afflictions associated with anger, such as rage, not concomitant with the secondary mental afflictions associated with attachment, such as avarice? Because they have incompatible ways of apprehending their objects, just as anger and attachment do. Why must both shamelessness and nonembarrassment be concomitant with all nonvirtuous minds? Because one cannot create nonvirtue unless one avoids shunning wrongdoing out of consideration for oneself or others. [148] Why are dullness, excitation, faithlessness, laziness, and heedlessness concomitant with all the other mental afflictions? Because something cannot be a mental affliction unless it makes the mind unclear, scatter outward, and become turbid, unless it does not delight in virtue and is bereft of protecting the mind from nonvirtue. It is explained in the commentaries on the *Compendium of Knowledge* that the statement about dullness and excitation being concomitant with all mental afflictions is to be understood as being made by Asaṅga in order to conform to the tenets of the Hīnayāna schools. The point is that some form of mental unserviceability and lack of serenity are present in all mental afflictions.

Three Stages of Wisdom: Learning, Reflection, and Meditation

Analyzing an object by means of correct reasoning will gradually produce three levels of wisdom generated through learning, critical reflection, and meditative cultivation in that order. Learning about a topic through listening to someone else teach it is mere *learning*. The wisdom properly comprehending what has been heard is the wisdom arisen from learning. This is generated through the causal capacity of someone else. Then carefully analyzing, using scripture and reasoning, what one has understood from that learning is *critical reflection*. The insight arisen from ascertaining what this analysis reveals is the wisdom arisen from critical reflection. This is generated through one's own causal capacity. *Meditative cultivation* refers to bringing the subject to mind again and again in accordance with what one has ascertained through learning and reflection. It is through such meditative cultivation by way of repeated familiarity that the wisdom arisen from meditative cultivation is generated. There are two types of such meditative cultivation: analytical meditation involves rationally analyzing and bringing the ascertained meaning to mind again and again; and stabilizing meditation, which is without such discursive analysis, consists of keeping the mind single-pointedly focused on the chosen object. Buddhist texts explain these three types of wisdom — arisen from learning, reflection, and meditative cultivation — as the crucial means for the mind to enhance its capacity to engage reality. [396]

In the beginning it is extremely important to generate the wisdom arisen from learning. Its beneficial qualities are stated as follows in Āryaśūra's *Garland of Birth Stories*:

> Learning is the lamp that dispels the darkness of delusion;
> it is the best wealth, one that cannot be stolen by thieves and others;
> it is the weapon that destroys the enemy, confusion;

it is the supreme friend that reveals personal instructions, the best course to take;
it is the unwavering dear friend even when one suffers misfortune;
it is the medicine for the sickness of sorrow with no side effects;
it is the destroyer of legions of great faults;
it is also the supreme treasure of glory and renown;
it is the best gift when meeting with wise people;
when in an assembly, it brings pleasure to the learned ones. [489]

Learning is like the lamp that dispels the darkness of delusion because, for example, even knowing only one letter of the alphabet, such as *a*, removes the obscuration of not knowing *a* and produces an experience of understanding that knows it; then knowing all twenty-six letters of the alphabet removes the obscuration of not knowing them and produces an experience of understanding that knows them. Likewise, whatever learning we accomplish, just that purifies more and more the darkness of ignorance and increases the dawning of wisdom more and more. [397] Learning is the best wealth, one that cannot be stolen by thieves and others. Ordinary wealth can be stolen by thieves or plundered by enemies, but it is impossible for the good qualities of learning to be stolen. It is the weapon that destroys the enemy, confusion; indeed, by relying on learning, all the enemies, the mental afflictions, can be completely uprooted. Learning is also the supreme friend, expert in giving faultless instruction to oneself. When it is time to do something, then through having previously engaged in learning, one knows whether that action is suitable or unsuitable, how to do what is suitable or stop what is unsuitable, and their respective benefits and faults. Likewise, learning is the medicine for the sickness of mental afflictions and the army destroying legions of enemies that are the faults. Also, it is the supreme treasure, glory, and renown. It is the best gift when meeting with wise people. When in an assembly, it brings pleasure to the learned ones.

Buddhist texts explain the definitions of learning, reflection, and meditation in the following way. “Wisdom arisen from learning” is a cognition differentiating phenomena that is generated on the basis of another source, such as a teacher or a valid scripture. For example, in

dependence on hearing or reading a text teaching that sound is impermanent, an understanding that arrives at knowing a general statement — namely, that sound is impermanent — is such a level of understanding. "Wisdom arisen from critical reflection" is a cognition that has reached ascertainment through rationally analyzing the meaning of what has been learned. An example is an inferential cognition realizing that sound is impermanent. "Wisdom arisen from meditative cultivation" is an awareness supported by special pliancy that has arisen from [398] repeatedly and undistractedly habituating or familiarizing the mind, through either stabilizing or analytical meditation as appropriate, with the meaning experienced as a result of learning and reflection. Examples of this are both calm abiding and special insight. The *Treasury of Knowledge Autocommentary*, for example, says: "It is explained, 'Wisdom arisen from learning is ascertainment that arises from trustworthy valid scriptures, wisdom arisen from reflection is ascertainment that arises from definitive analysis with reasoning, and wisdom arisen from meditative cultivation is ascertainment that arises from concentration.' This seems to faultlessly state their definitions." [490]

The text also describes "causes of calm abiding, firm apprehension, and equanimity"; these, respectively, mean the following. When special insight is stronger and calm abiding is weaker, the mind fluctuates like an oil lamp in the wind; thus the meditation object is not seen clearly. At that time, attention focuses on the cause or sign of calm abiding, the method for drawing the mind inward. In the opposite situation, it is like being asleep, thus ultimate reality is not seen clearly. At that time, attention should be focused on firm apprehension's sign, the method for uplifting the mind. When both calm abiding and special insight operate equally of their own accord, attention should be brought to equanimity's sign. [399]

In general, mere wisdom arisen from learning is not certain to bring about a change in one's physical or verbal behavior. If, however, one is able to attain mastery of the relevant subject through critical reflection and meditation, and especially gain experiential understanding through meditative cultivation, this can greatly transform one's habitual ways of thinking as well as one's physical and verbal behavior. Therefore both critical reflection and meditative cultivation are ways for a person to

imbue their mindstream with cognitions that are correct with regard to understanding the meaning of what one has heard. In this way, one must tether one's behavior of body, speech, and mind to what one has understood at the time of hearing, as if bound by a rope. Thus, given the crucial importance of critical reflection and meditative cultivation with regard to positive transformation of a person's physical, verbal, and mental conduct, the Buddhist texts provide detailed presentations of the wisdom arisen from reflection (induced by powerful reasoning) as well as the meditative practices that constitute the method for cultivating the wisdom arisen from meditation. [400]

The Importance of Mindfulness and Meta-Awareness

Mindfulness is the mental factor that prevents one from forgetting the object and its aspects that are to be adopted or abandoned. Meta-awareness is the mental factor that analyzes one's conduct of body, speech, and mind from moment to moment and brings about an understanding of whether it is virtuous or nonvirtuous. Both of these mental factors are very important — not only at the time of learning and reflecting about what one needs to know — but also in everyday life. By maintaining continual awareness of each point to be adopted or abandoned without confusing them, mindfulness helps retain them without forgetting. Then, having understood which points are to be adopted or abandoned, meta-awareness acts as a spy at the time of engaging in any conduct and thinks "I will do such-and-such." When mindfulness and meta-awareness have both been developed, then one behaves skillfully without error — doing what is to be adopted and not doing what is to be abandoned.

To generate such mindfulness and meta-awareness, one must always practice heedfulness [which protects the mind from afflictive mental factors and promotes virtue]. To give rise to heedfulness, one must consider the benefits of practicing heedfulness and the faults of not doing so. How does this work? If one gives rise to heedfulness, then mindfulness and meta-awareness will be generated. In dependence on that, one will adopt good qualities and abandon faults without error. [401]

In the context of learning, reflecting, and so on, one can explain the practice of mindfulness and meta-awareness as follows. Whatever the mind is engaged in, one needs a method both to prevent it from wandering away from the main object of focus and to recognize whether it is wandering away or not. The first is the function of mindfulness and the second is the function of meta-awareness. Vasubandhu's *Explanation of the Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sūtras* says: "Mindfulness and meta-awareness enable the mind to focus because the former prevents the mind from wandering away from its object while the latter makes one clearly aware if it is wandering." [491] If we have mindfulness and meta-awareness in our mindstreams, then not only do we study the textual traditions without

distortion and understand their meaning without forgetting, but we also give rise to good qualities that we did not have before, and those already arisen are further improved. Also, our behavior of body, speech, and mind will not fall under the power of the contrary side, the mental afflictions.

Furthermore, we will remain immune to the faults of nonvirtuous tendencies if we are able to sustain mindfulness and meta-awareness, as is mentioned in the *Great Play Sūtra*:

> Having skillfully applied mindfulness
> and having well cultivated wisdom,
> I will act with meta-awareness. [402]
> Evil mind, what will you do now? [492]

This indicates the following: one applies mindfulness focused on the proper object of one's activity, while analyzing it accurately with wisdom differentiating good and bad; and using the spy of meta-awareness that recognizes whether the mind has wandered away from that meaningful activity to be done, then evil minds — mental afflictions such as laziness, distraction, and so on — cannot do any harm. Conversely, if we do not apply mindfulness, meta-awareness, and heedfulness, then although we may appear to know many points at the time of learning and reflecting, when we enter into actual practice, what was studied earlier does not become an object of our mindfulness or recollection. This is like pouring water into a pot that has a leak. *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> In one whose mind lacks meta-awareness,
> what has been learned, contemplated, and meditated on
> does not remain in mindful recollection,
> just like water in a leaky pot. [493]

If mindfulness and meta-awareness degenerate, the mind will be disturbed by mental afflictions. In that case, whatever activity of listening, reflecting, and studying that one may engage in will not give rise to any greatly beneficial result owing to a weak capacity to accomplish that activity. [403] It is like people whose physical elements are so disturbed

by sickness that they are too weak to do any useful work. *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> Just as people disturbed by illness
> have no power to do any useful work,
> those whose minds are disturbed by confusion
> have no power to do any useful work. [494]

In brief, without mindfulness and meta-awareness, previously present good qualities deteriorate, and new ones do not arise. Nāgārjuna's *Friendly Letter* says:

> With mindfulness impaired, all qualities diminish. [495]

Having pointed out the benefits of applying mindfulness and meta-awareness and the faults of not applying them, we now discuss why, in general, a person who is a beginner must guard his or her mind in the following way. When someone with a physical wound is in a throng of excited people whose behavior is uncontrolled, then he or she is careful of that wound and protects it. Likewise, when you are in a mob of careless people who give license to attachment and hatred, then you must always guard the wound of your mind. With mindfulness you remember what is to be adopted and abandoned according to the circumstances without forgetting, and with meta-awareness you scrutinize whether a specific action is suitable [404] or unsuitable. If you do not guard it in this way, you will thereby miss the point of learning and reflecting, and you will cut the root of present and future happiness for yourself and others. *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> Just as I take care of a bodily wound and cover it
> when amid a rough and jostling crowd,
> so too, when amid a crowd of careless people,
> I must always protect the wound of my mind. [496]

How do we apply mindfulness? In a worldly situation, if a man's sword falls from his hand when fighting an enemy, he immediately picks it up

out of fear that the other may kill him. Likewise, if we lose our mindfulness — which ensures that we do not forget the object and its aspects that are to be practiced or abandoned when struggling with mental afflictions such as heedlessness — then we must immediately take up mindfulness again out of fear of falling into a wrong course of action. *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> If someone drops his sword in battle
> he immediately picks it up out of fear;
> likewise, if I lose my weapon of mindfulness,
> then recollecting the fears of hell, I must quickly retrieve it. [497]

Thus this text explains from numerous perspectives the great importance of applying mindfulness. As for how to apply meta-awareness, *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> At the outset, first recognizing that
> my mind has faults, [405]
> I should remain controlled,
> like a piece of wood. [498]

At the outset of engaging in any action, one should first discern the motivation for engaging in that action, the purpose of doing it, whether it is appropriate or inappropriate, and so on. Then, if one recognizes through meta-awareness that faulty motivations and so forth have arisen, one must be able to hold one's mind stable, like a piece of wood, without allowing it to be moved by the defilements. This is how one relies on meta-awareness at the start of an action. Next, in all contexts, whether walking, moving, lying down, sitting, speaking, thinking, and so on, one mindfully recollects what is appropriate and inappropriate, and with meta-awareness acting as a spy, one examines again and again whether one's activities of body, speech, and mind are concordant or discordant [with the appropriate activities that one is mindfully recollecting]. This is how meta-awareness protects one when one is about to engage in any action of body, speech, and mind. *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says:

> To observe again and again
> the state of one's body and mind:
> just this alone, in brief,
> is the definition of guarding meta-awareness. [499]

In brief, how does someone wanting victory over the mental afflictions — such as ignorance, heedlessness, and distraction — apply mindfulness and meta-awareness? Here *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds* says: [406]

> Those who engage in practice should be as intent
> as a frightened man carrying a jar full of mustard oil
> while being surveilled by someone brandishing a sword
> and threatening to kill him if he spills any. [500]

Suppose a person has been ordered by a cruel king to walk along a path carrying a jar filled with mustard oil while accompanied by a man wielding a sword who has been told, "If he spills even one drop of oil, you must kill him instantly!" Such a person will try very hard indeed to be vigilant, out of fear for his life. When a person engages in any actions of body, speech, and mind, he or she must be vigilant like this, maintaining mindfulness and meta-awareness with regard to what is suitable or unsuitable to engage in. One can infer from their behavior what degree of seriousness and alertness such a person has adopted at that time. As for the causes, definitions, functions, and classifications of both mindfulness and meta-awareness, these should be understood from the earlier section where the mental factors were explained. [407]

View, Meditation, and Conduct

In general, phenomena that are categorized as mental arise through causal conditioning. Hence, the following consequences ensue: when the causes and conditions producing them either increase or decrease, the resultant mental states will also increase or decrease accordingly. In proportion to the degree of habituation to a mental state, that state arises more easily. In this way, the features of that mental state will gradually become part of one's habitual nature.

Buddhist texts contain specific discussions about how, on the basis of learning, reflection, and meditative cultivation — or alternatively, through view, meditation, and conduct — a gradual transformation of the mind can take place. In particular, one can gain conviction about how, through targeted mental training, the expressions or behavior of both one's internal mind and one's external body and speech can be transformed. An important feature of this explanation of how inner transformation within one's mind brings about external changes in one's conduct of body and speech is how Buddhist texts distinguish among view, meditation, and conduct. First, we need to change the faulty *views* we might have. Then, on the basis of such methods as analytical and stabilizing *meditation*, we need to cultivate familiarity with those perspectives connected with the correct view. In this way, so it is explained, our *conduct* of body and speech will change so that they proceed in a virtuous direction. [408]

Concerning view, meditation, and conduct, in general meditation involves familiarizing oneself again and again with the chosen object that is the focus of one's meditation. Dharmamitra's *Clarifying Words* commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom says: "To meditate is to make the mind acquire the object's qualities or understand its reality." [501] As we saw above, there are two types: *analytical meditation*, which is to meditate by analyzing with the wisdom of fine investigation, and *stabilizing meditation*, which is to place the mind single-pointedly on the object without analyzing. In general calm abiding is a type of stabilizing meditation, and special insight is a type of analytical meditation. However, not all single-pointed meditation is calm abiding, and not all analytical

meditation is special insight. As explained extensively below, stabilizing meditation is to meditate while placing the mind single-pointedly without distraction on a single basis or object of meditation, and analytical meditation is to meditate while contemplating many scriptural citations, reasons, examples, and so on concerning the deeper meaning of the object of meditation.

There are, however, many other forms of meditation. For example, in the context of meditating on impermanence and emptiness, one meditates in relation to the object as cognized. One may also meditate by generating a particular subjective state, as in the cultivation of loving kindness and compassion. Other forms of meditation involve contemplating the characteristics or aspects that resemble states more advanced than one's own, as when meditating on higher qualities that one has not yet attained. Alternatively, one can speak of meditating on a feature of an object, as when one meditates on all conditioned things as impermanent, [409] or of meditating on a subjective feature, as when one cultivates compassion by generating one's mind into the state of compassion.

As for the object of meditation, Asaṅga's *Śrāvaka Levels* says: "What are the objects [of meditation]? There are four types of objects: pervasive objects, objects that purify behavior, objects of mastery, and objects that purify mental afflictions."[502] As for a detailed explanation of these four types of meditation objects, these need to be learned from the great texts themselves.[503] In this same text of Asaṅga, it also states that one may categorize meditation practice in terms of the degree of acuity of the meditator's faculties and also in terms of the behavior or temperament from the standpoint of afflictive mental states. In terms of habituation to mental afflictions, there are seven types of temperaments: (1) attachment predominates, (2) aversion predominates, (3) delusion predominates, (4) pride predominates, (5) distorted thinking predominates, (6) equally balanced temperament, (7) less afflictive temperament.[504] Also, in terms of actual engagement in practice, the same text explains that there are persons who engage by way of faith and those who do so by way of things themselves [410] — that is, those who rationally analyze the way things exist. One should understand these points by referring to detailed scriptural sources such as Asaṅga's *Śravaka Levels*, Vasubandhu's

Treasury of Knowledge and its *Autocommentary*, Śāntideva's *Compendium of Training*, and Kamalaśīla's *Stages of Meditation*; these texts contain extensive explanations about how reliance on specific types of meditation objects by these different types of persons will have widely varying impact on the transformation of their minds. Thus these texts explain, in their presentations on meditation, types of people who meditate, what are the objects of meditation, how to engage in meditation, and how meditation gradually brings about mental transformation. A brief explanation of these will be offered below in the context of how to cultivate calm abiding and special insight.